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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last quarter century, a profound restructuring of U.S. labor 
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markets has occurred. Long-term job tenure, internal labor markets, and 
employer-sponsored benefits have waned under the pressures of neoliberal 
globalization. The trend is toward increasingly precarious, shorter-term, 
serial employment relationships that offer significantly lower wages, 
reduced job-related benefits, and formidable obstacles to the exercise of 
employment rights.1 This fundamental shift has moved so-called “non-
standard” employment arrangements, once viewed as marginal, into the 
core economy. As a result, a remarkable array of profit-driven labor market 
intermediaries (LMIs) are now embedded in mainstream labor markets. 
Temporary help and staffing agencies, payrolling and employee leasing 
firms, and other for-profit, labor-only contractors are now integral to 
“flexible” staffing practices and just-in-time production methods being 
used in industries as varied as software engineering, building construction, 
manufacturing, legal and accounting services, and healthcare.2 For-profit 
LMIs are prospering in today’s high velocity labor markets,3 contributing 
to the dominant lean-market paradigm by enabling the rapid movement of 
workers through serial, short-term, no-frills employment arrangements.  
A unique array of workplace ills is associated with the operation of 
profit-driven LMIs in casual and high-velocity labor markets.4 Legal 
disputes involving temporary workers (temps) deployed by commercial 
LMIs have challenged the denial of earned pension benefits5 and the 
 1. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 67-83 (2004); see generally GUY STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLEXIBILITY: 
SEEKING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 49-289 (1999). 
 2. See, e.g., Marcelo Estevao & Saul Lach, The Evolution of the Demand for Temporary Help 
Supply Employment in the U.S., in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF 
CHANGING EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 123, 130-40 (Francoise Carre et al., eds., 2000); David 
Finegold et al., A Temporary Route to Advancement?: The Career Opportunities for Low-Skilled 
Workers in Temporary Employment, in LOW–WAGE AMERICA: HOW EMPLOYERS ARE RESHAPING 
OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORKPLACE 317, 340-47 (Eileen Applebaum et al., eds., 2006); Arne L. 
Kalleberg et al., Externalizing Employment: Flexible Staffing Arrangements in US Organizations 32 
SOC. SCI. RES. 525, 530, tbl. 2 (2003) (compiling organizational studies of flexible staffing 
arrangements in the U.S.); Anne E. Polivka et al., Definition, Composition, and Economic 
Consequences of the Nonstandard Workforce, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra, at 41, 69-72, tbls. 4a, 
4b. 
 3. See CHRIS BENNER ET AL., STAIRCASES OR TREADMILLS? LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 4 (2007); STONE, supra note 1, at 69-70; 
Jamie Peck et al., Constructing Markets for Temporary Labour: Employment Liberalization and the 
Internationalization of the Staffing Industry, 5 GLOBAL NETWORKS 3 (2005); Douglas J. Miller & Jay 
B. Barney, Employer Perspectives: Competing Through A Flexible Workforce, in THE SHADOW 
WORKFORCE: PERSPECTIVES ON CONTINGENT WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND EUROPE 65, 
83-90 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 2006). 
 4. See Steven L. Willborn, Leased Workers: Vulnerability and the Need for Special Legislation, 
19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 85, 85-95 (1997). 
 5. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the employer’s 
recognition that workers were employees, rather than independent contractors, made workers eligible 
for ERISA benefits, even though workers were labeled independent contractors in employment 
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limited access to unemployment insurance6 and workers’ compensation.7 
The refusal of employers to collectively bargain over temps’ terms of 
employment has been challenged,8 and temps have sought redress for the 
failure of temporary staffing agencies to provide legally mandated safety 
equipment.9 Other untoward, but widely used practices of the commercial 
LMI remain largely beyond the reach of contemporary workplace law. 
Recruiting temps with false promises of permanent employment, using 
contracting methods to conceal the rate of exploitation of the temporary 
work force, and restricting temps’ access to permanent employment at 
client firms are not legally cognizable injuries under the current workplace 
law paradigm.10 On the macro level, the proliferation of profit-driven LMIs 
has engendered a second-tier workforce numbering in the millions. The 
lower pay scales and non-existent benefits suffered by the temp agency 
workforce constitute a “hidden fee” that for-profit LMIs extract for the 
“privilege” of being deployed in the labor market. These normative 
practices undermine the economic security of all workers by reducing the 
pressure on employers to raise the wages and provide benefits11 to the so-
called “standard” workforce. Profit-driven LMIs also weaken the existing 
regulatory regime of workplace law by shielding employers who use 
temporary staffing agencies from the legal and contractual obligations they 
would otherwise have to a segment of their workforce.12 
agreements). 
 6. NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, MENDING THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA- TION 
SAFETY NET FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS 32-37 (1997), available at <http://nelp. 3cdn.net/ 
36ec3b0332f754a030_0vm6iyr99.pdf> (last visited July 20, 2009). 
 7. See, e.g., White v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. App. 1986) (contesting under 
Michigan’s workers compensation laws the user firm’s status as an employer of a temp); see also 
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers 
without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 266-67 
(2006). 
 8. See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343 
N.L.R.B. 76 (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., News Release, OSHA Region 4, USDOL: 00-201, OSHA Fines Orange City, Fla., 
Waste Hauling Company $122,500 Following Worker Fatality (Nov. 1, 2000), available at 
<http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=350
> (temp worker fatality resulting from failure to provide personal protective equipment) (last visited on 
July 20, 2009). 
 10. See, e.g., Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to Worker Representation: 
Insights from the Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355, 367-70 (2005-06). 
 11. Workers deployed through profit-driven LMIs, like most nonstandard workers, experience a 
pervasive absence of fringe benefits. See ROBERT E. PARKER, FLESH PEDDLERS AND WARM BODIES: 
THE TEMPORARY HELP INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS 112-14, 137-53 (1994); Kalleberg et al., supra 
note 2, at 540 (finding that 41 percent of managers turn to temp agencies to lower costs by avoiding 
payment of fringe benefits); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The High-Pressure U.S. Labor 
Market of the 1990s, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Nov. 1999, at 1. 
 12. See David Autor, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the 
Growth of Employment Outsourcing, 21 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2003); Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status 
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Legal scholars, however, have given little attention to the relationship 
between the unique mode of exploitation experienced by workers in 
triangular employment relationships and the legal status of for-profit LMIs 
under U.S. workplace law. With few exceptions, federal and state work 
laws classify and treat for-profit LMIs as “employers,” a dubious and, at 
best, incomplete assignation that has left both the market-mediating and 
job-brokering functions of profit-driven LMIs unregulated. Because 
modern workplace law retains a bipolar foundation that identifies only 
employers and those who work for them, its “zone of statutory 
protection”13 offers a crabbed and problematic paradigm that fails to 
address the workplace ills that arise in mediated employment relationships 
involving employers, employees, and for-profit LMIs.14 
This article argues that regulation of profit-driven job brokering – 
particularly the so-called mark-up, i.e. the difference between the wages 
paid to a temp worker and the contract price a user firm pays the temp 
agency for “use” of a temp – is essential to rectify the second-class status 
of the ever-growing workforce being deployed by commercial LMIs. Such 
regulation requires construction of a distinct legal status for profit-driven 
LMIs that encapsulates an LMI’s dual role in triangular employment 
relationships, i.e. as the employer of record for temporary workers and its 
fundamental institutional role as a job broker that negotiates the terms 
under which labor is deployed to the employer’s locus of production or 
service provision. To this end, the argument has five parts. Part II identifies 
the fundamental features of mediated, high velocity labor markets and 
examines the distinct workplace ills attendant to the widespread operation 
of profit-driven LMIs. This examination particularly focuses on the 
commercial temporary help or staffing agency, the largest and most widely 
utilized LMI in today’s labor markets. Part III recounts the labor struggles 
and legislative initiatives of the Progressive Era aimed at curbing the 
exploitive practices of labor contractors and private employment agencies, 
the scourge of late nineteenth and early twentieth century labor markets and 
the progenitors of today’s profit-driven LMIs. Progressive era reformers 
and labor activists not only succeeded in enacting laws regulating the 
“employment sharks,” they advanced the use of public labor exchanges to 
in Triangular Employment Relationships, 42 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 727, 736 (2004); Frances Raday, 
The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting, 20 COMP. LAB. L & POL’Y. J. 413, 416-19 
(1999). 
 13. Stephen Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 153, 165 (2003). 
 14. See Virginia L. duRivage et al., Making Labor Law Work for Part-Time and Contingent 
Workers, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 263 (Kathleen 
Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); Willborn, supra note 4, at 88. 
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provide a not-for-profit institution that could pair workers with jobs. Part 
IV examines the socio-legal factors that marginalized the employment 
agency business in the New Deal era and the rise of the comprehensive 
federal labor law scheme that arose to regulate the union hiring hall, 
organized labor’s answer to private, profit-driven, employer-controlled 
modes of hiring. Part V recounts the largely ignored legislative campaign 
undertaken in the 1960s by the young temporary staffing industry that has 
allowed most profit-driven LMIs to avoid virtually all government 
regulation of its brokering and mediating functions for the last four 
decades. In Part VI we assess recent legislative reforms affecting temporary 
workers deployed by for-profit LMIs and the significance of nascent 
government and labor-sponsored LMIs that are developing as alternatives 
to the commercial LMI paradigm. This discussion highlights the 
significance of worker centers run by day-laborers and the rise of new 
forms of the public labor exchange, the government sponsored, union-
organized home-care authority, i.e. an LMI created in many states that has 
raised wages and improved work conditions for hundreds of thousands of 
low-wage, casually employed home health-care aids. The Conclusion 
proposes core elements of a regulatory scheme that can protect the rights 
and interests of agency workers deployed by profit-driven LMIs in order to 
create a legal climate that can redress the myriad social problems arising 
from their hegemony in contemporary high-mobility labor markets. 
II. PROFIT-DRIVEN TRIANGULAR EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LABOR MARKETS 
A. Types of For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries 
LMIs are commonly defined in terms of what is presumed to be their 
core function, as institutions engaged in active job matching.15 This 
characterization, however, trivializes certain other key and sometimes 
primary functions served by LMIs and leaves some types of intermediaries 
completely out of the picture. So-called “employment leasing” and 
“payrolling” firms, for instance, are not involved in recruiting workers or in 
“matching” them with employers. These LMIs place workers that have 
been recruited by the client firm, or who are already in employment with 
the client firm, on their own payroll, thereby becoming what has come to 
be called the “employer of record.”16 The common definition of LMIs, as 
 15. See, e.g., BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-11. 
 16. Many temporary or staffing agencies engaged in recruitment and matching also perform this 
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Professor Paul Osterman points out, fails to recognize important 
distinctions that identify different types of LMIs. Osterman labels as 
“traditional” those LMIs that “passively accept job orders from firms and 
match these orders with people who have registered with the 
intermediary.”17 Traditional intermediaries include job-matching websites 
like Monster.com and state-sponsored and funded departments of 
employment and training. More important for our analysis are those LMIs 
that Osterman describes as “more active and aggressive in their relations to 
both sides of the labor market.”18 In addition to job placement and skills 
training, these LMIs may “bargain with firms or deploy power in order to 
alter firm behavior.”19 In other words, this group of LMIs is 
“interventionist,” having the effect of “changing the terms of trade in the 
labor market.”20 
We employ this understanding of the various types and functions of 
LMIs in order to identify the broad range of institutions currently operating 
as brokers in the employment relationship. This includes the ubiquitous 
temporary help agency that deploys workers at all skill levels to 
manufacturers, health care institutions, and a range of service industries. It 
also allows for consideration of union-sponsored hiring halls that provide a 
portal of entry into the job market for the skilled construction trades, 
entertainment workers, and longshoremen as well as the scores of workers 
centers21 that offer day laborers a more structured, less-exploitive 
alternative to street-corner hiring. 
This broader definition permits a comparative and historical analysis 
of LMIs that can take stock of the societal benefits and ills that are 
unevenly distributed among these various forms. It also facilitates an 
assessment of the widely disparate regulatory regimes that govern different 
kind of “payrolling” or “leasing” as one of their “services.” It is important to note that the contract 
negotiated between the leasing firm and the client-employer usually alters the terms of employment. 
DAVID WEST, PEOS AND PAYROLLING: A HISTORY OF PROBLEMS AND A FUTURE WITHOUT BENEFITS 
(2001), <http://www.cfcw.org/PEO.pdf> (last visited on July 20, 2009); see also Peggie R. Smith et al., 
Contingent Workers: Lesson 5: Proceedings of the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
661, 665-69 (2001) (comments of Stephen Strong). 
 17. PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW IT HAS 
CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 134 (1999). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.; see also, BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-11 (describing LMIs like temp and staffing 
agencies as engaging in “active job matching”); Robert P. Giloth, Introduction: A Case for Workforce 
Intermediaries, in WORKFORCE INTERMEDIARIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 6-8 (Robert P. 
Giloth ed., 2004). 
 21. See JANICE FINE, WORKERS CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE 
DREAM 11-14 (2006). 
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types of LMIs that perform equivalent socio-economic functions in today’s 
labor markets. This, in turn, allows for a discussion of two interconnected, 
historically contingent questions: First, what form of LMI best serves the 
interests of the non-standard labor market at a time when wages, 
employment benefits and job security are on the decline; and second, can 
improved regulation create socio-legal conditions that permit not-for-profit 
LMIs to challenge the hegemony of the commercial LMI by offering better 
wages and benefits for the non-standard workforce while still successfully 
performing job-matching for employers? 
B. The Socioeconomic Framework: The Indispensable Role of Labor 
Market Intermediaries in High Velocity Labor Markets 
For-profit LMIs – including temp agencies, employee leasing firms 
and all variety of commercial “middle-men” – deploy workers in virtually 
every economic sector, effectuating employment relationships that are by 
design short-term, seasonal, or cyclical.22 Recent data suggests that this 
trend is ongoing,23 with three forms of commercial LMIs occupying the 
field. The temporary help agency comprises 71 percent of the commercial 
LMI industry, followed by the professional employer organization (PEO) 
which accounts for 21 percent.24 The “traditional” employment agency, 
including specialized “headhunting” operations, accounts for only 8 percent 
of the industry.25 The temporary staffing agency clearly dominates and, 
therefore, is the focus of our discussion of commercial LMIs. 
The size of the workforce deployed by LMIs in any given industry or 
enterprise varies widely. At one extreme, the use of commercial LMIs has 
spawned a new category of enterprise, aptly labeled “non-employers”: 
 22. In 1997, 46 percent of U.S. firms used some form of labor market intermediary to hire 
workers. Including arrangements not involving an intermediary, e.g. independent contractors, short-
term hires, and on call workers, 78 percent of private sector employers engaged temporary or contingent 
workers using a variety of “flexible staffing arrangements.” See Dale Belman & Lonnie Golden, 
Nonstandard and Contingent Employment: Contrasts by Job Type, Industry and Occupation, in 
NONSTANDARD WORK supra note 2, at 167, 169. 
 23. Deployment by commercial LMIs continues to rise, accounting for 10 percent of the net 
employment growth in the last decade of the twentieth century. See George A. Erickcek et al., The 
Effects of Temporary Services and Contracting Out on Low-Skilled Workers: Evidence from Auto 
Suppliers, Hospitals, and Public Schools, in LOW-WAGE AMERICA, supra note 2, at 368. 
 24. Matthew Dey et al., Manufacturers’ Outsourcing to Employment Services 4 (Upjohn Staff 
Working Paper No. 07-132, 2006), available at <http://www.upjohn.org/publications/ wp/07-132.pdf>. 
PEOs, previously known as employment leasing companies, often lease an entire workforce back to the 
client company. However, the percentage of workers in a given facility deployed by the much larger 
temporary staffing industry can approach similar levels. A recent study describes a package delivery 
firm outside a large metropolitan area in the southeast that employed 270 persons; only eight were 
permanent employees, the rest were temp agency hires. Finegold et al., supra note 2, at 343. 
 25. See Dey et al., supra note 24, at 4 (basing information on 2005 labor force data). 
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business enterprises that own productive capital and produce goods or 
services, but, legally speaking, employ no one; the entire workforce is 
provided by employment agents26 or labeled as independent contractors. In 
most circumstances, however, agency workers constitute a smaller fraction 
of the client’s workforce, hired for low-cost, short-term work and to 
accommodate rapid shifts in production levels.27 Temp agencies are often 
the source of labor for undesirable, repetitive, or physically demanding jobs 
where high turnover is endemic, e.g., assembly work, packing and loading 
jobs, and “low-end” health care industry jobs.28 Commercial LMIs are also 
used to accommodate seasonal or short-term business fluctuations or to fill 
an intermittent need for specialized skill sets.29 Increasingly, temp agencies 
are performing secondary human resource functions by providing user 
firms with a means of screening potential hires; in effect, temp agencies are 
engaged to create a pre-probationary period of employment to select the 
most productive individuals who best “fit” firm culture30 and, in some 
cases, to weed out union-minded individuals.31 While short-term cyclical 
jobs are the norm for temporary staffing industry, the deployment of so-
called perma-temps – individuals deployed by an agency who have the 
same assignment for more than a year, acquiring long-term, second-class 
status in a given workplace – has also risen. In 2005 “perma-temps” 
accounted for more than one-third of temp agency workers.32 
Commercial LMIs have become a structural force in the global 
economy. In any given labor market, the percentage of the workforce 
deployed by temporary agencies can be significant.33 Addeco, Inc., the 
 26. Molly Selvin & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, L.A. Area Leads in Employers That Aren’t, L.A. 
TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A1. 
 27. For instance, a study that included the use of temps by Michigan auto industry parts supplier, 
found temp agency workers comprising between 15 and 25 percent of a factory’s workforce. Erickcek, 
supra note 23, at 380-82. 
 28. See Jamie Peck & Nick Theodore, Flexible Recession: The Temporary Staffing Industry and 
Mediated Work in the United States, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 171, 172-73 (2007). 
 29. See, e.g., JACKIE KRASAS ROGERS, TEMPS: THE MANY FACES OF THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 
127-51 (2000) (providing a detailed ethnographic account of lawyers employed by temp agencies). 
 30. See VICKI SMITH & ESTHER B. NEUWIRTH, THE GOOD TEMP 69-72 (2008); Erickcek, supra 
note 23, at 379-80. 
 31. See, e.g., Erickcek, supra note 23, at 380. 
 32. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007, at 9 (2006). 
However, many firms are now insisting that long-term “temp” assignments be limited to one year in 
order to avoid the legal liabilities that may attach if the temps are viewed as permanent employees 
under federal employment or tax laws. See, e.g., Finegold et al., supra note 2, at 319; see also Vizcaino 
v. Microsoft, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that long term temps may be entitled to stock 
options offered to permanent employees). 
 33. For example, a study comparing California’s Silicon Valley area with Milwaukee indicated 
that over a three-year period, 15 percent of the workforce (between ages twenty-five to sixty-five) 
obtained work through a temp agency. See Laura Leete et al., Labor Market Intermediaries in the Old 
and New Economies: A Survey of Worker Experiences in Milwaukee and Silicon Valley, in 
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world’s largest temporary help agency, had international revenues of more 
than twenty-three billion dollars in 200534 and as of 2009, deployed more 
than 700,000 workers daily.35 Manpower, Inc., placed four million people 
in permanent and temporary job positions in 2008, earning profits of more 
than $ 647 million36 on contracts with 400,000 employers, including small 
and medium size businesses, as well as the world’s largest multinational 
corporations.37 Multinational temporary staffing corporations like Labor 
Ready, Manpower, or Addeco are “equal opportunity” institutions, 
operating at multiple entry points in the labor market.38 In many labor 
markets, the multinational temporary staffing agencies are supplemented by 
local or specialized, industry-specific temp operations that often use well-
developed social networks to solicit and dispense highly skilled 
professionals to corporate offices and IT firms39 or to deploy unskilled 
laborers to low-wage manual labor, clerical, or service jobs.40 Some low-
wage staffing agencies also operate in the unregulated, informal economy 
deploying undocumented immigrants to unscrupulous employers.41 
The significance of the profit-driven LMI, however, cannot be 
assessed by totaling up the number of temps these institutions deploy.42 
WORKFORCE INTERMEDIARIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 20, at 263, 268. 
Moreover, several times the number employed are “registered” at agencies each day, i.e., an even larger 
number of workers are part of the reserve for the temporary labor market at any given time. 
 34. Neil Coe et al., Mapping the Globalization of the Temporary Staffing Industry, 59 PROF. 
GEOGRAPHER 503, 508 (2007). 
 35. Adecco, The World Leader in Workforce Solutions, <http://www.adeccousa.com/ 
AboutUs/Pages/CorporateOverview.aspx?submenuid=2.0> (last visited July 28, 2009) (including all 
workers deployed in over seventy countries and territories). 
 36. MANPOWER INC. 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 14, 17 (2009), available at <http://files.share 
holder.com/downloads/MAN/691094753x0x276784/27885379-A46B-4010-9C80-AE9AB0AB4  
C9A/MANPOWER_AR_08LR.pdf>. 
 37. About Manpower, <http://www.manpower.com/about/about.cfm> (last visited July 28, 2009). 
 38. See Polivka et al., supra note 2, at 69-72. See generally Kalleberg et al., supra note 2 
(summarizing organizational studies on size, scope and use of temporary and staffing agencies 
throughout the U.S. economy). 
 39. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. BARLEY & GIDEON KUNDA, GURUS, HIRED GUNS, AND WARM BODIES: 
ITINERANT WORKERS IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2004); Daniel Kerr & Christopher Dole, Cracking 
the Temp Trap: Day Laborers’ Grievances and Strategies for Change in Cleveland, Ohio, 29 LAB. 
STUD. J. 87, 87-108 (2005). 
 40. See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE REPORT: 
UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY 25-26 (2007); Tom Juravich, Guatemalans in New Bedford 
(2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
 41. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 25-26. 
 42. According to official statistics, temp agency workers account for roughly three out of each 
hundred jobs on a typical work day. Peck & Theodore, supra note 28, at 172. In 2001, the U.S. temp 
industry reported 21,696 temp and staffing agencies (offices), Timothy Brogan, Scaling New Heights: 
Annual Analysis of the Staffing Industry, STAFFING SUCCESS, May-June 2001, at, _____4, and the 
average daily employment by the temporary help staffing industry stood at 2.54 million. Finegold et al., 
supra note 2, at 320. At its peak, in September 2000, the industry employed about 3.5 million workers 
on any given day. But this daily employment figure is deceptive and underestimates the number of 
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The importance of the commercial LMI is its diffusion and integration into 
almost every labor market,43 spreading and legitimizing a range of 
mediated work relationships that serve a variety of core functions in 
today’s labor markets. The temporary workforce deployed by LMIs is no 
longer merely an ad hoc substitution for an otherwise standard job. Now, 
commercial intermediaries shape job design and impact how the labor force 
is supervised and controlled.44 They have become an integral institutional 
feature of flexible and just-in-time production patterns. As the 
disaggregation of the labor force continues in both the manufacturing and 
service sectors of the economy, profit-driven LMIs are increasingly used to 
facilitate the global economy’s evolving patterns of cost-cutting and 
outsourcing. The workforce deployed by commercial LMIs is routinely 
factored into human resource decision-making, such that the temporary 
staffing industry “can now be regarded as a stable component of the 
regulatory infrastructure of the labor market,”45 actively engaged in 
restructuring both the supply and demand sides of the labor market 
equation.46 
C. The Discontents of Temping: Characteristics of Mediated Employment 
through Profit-Driven Labor Market Intermediaries 
Unique social ills and modes of exploitation have always been 
associated with “labor-only” contractors that mediate employment 
relationships.47 The temp and staffing industry, the primary labor-only 
contractors in contemporary labor markets, rests on an exploitive paradigm 
with two basic components. The first component is hyper-precarious 
employment that substantially increases the vulnerability of the temp 
agency workforce. The use of temp or staffing agencies facilitates the 
workers deployed through temp agencies. Because turnover in the temporary industry is endemic, and 
the number of individuals deployed on a given day represents only one-fifth to one-quarter of the 
number a large temp agency deploys yearly, the number of persons who worked as temps in 1999 was 
between 9.6 and 12 million people – almost 10 percent of the working population. Id. at 317, 320. 
Further, a significant number of temps – perhaps millions – are deployed by agencies operating in the 
informal or “underground” sector. See, e.g., Michael Riley, Labor Brokers Cut Costs, Corners: Fast-
Growing Firms Exploit Immigrants to Feed Construction Industry, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A-
1. 
 43. As long ago as 1996, 78 percent of business establishments reported using at least one form of 
flexible staffing arrangements. Susan Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements: 
Evidence from an Establishment Survey, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 149, 151 (2001). 
 44. SMITH & NEUWIRTH, supra note 30, at 69-97. 
 45. Peck & Theodore, supra note 28, at 182. 
 46. Leete et al., supra note 33, at 263, 264. 
 47. Frances Raday, The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting, 20 COMP. LABOR L. 
& POLICY J. 413, 416 (1999); see also Willborn, supra note 4, at 88-89. 
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routine removal of temps from the workforce without the attendant legal 
and moral obligations that attach to the layoff or termination of employees 
hired under the standard employment paradigm. The precariousness of the 
employment relationship is exacerbated by the persistent presence of the 
marginal, “fly-by-night” temping agencies that can easily enter and leave a 
labor market because of the inordinately low level of capital outlay needed 
to start a temp agency. The second part of the paradigm is the temp agency 
workers’ second-tier wages and virtually non-existent benefits. Profit-
driven LMIs in ongoing triangular employment relationships are positioned 
to siphon off or capture a portion of the revenue stream generated by the 
economic enterprise before it reaches workers. The super-exploitation of 
temp workers derives in large part from the substantial difference between 
the hourly billing rate the agency charges the user firm and the hourly wage 
paid workers. This difference, or mark-up, constitutes a hidden fee charged 
to temp workers.48 The “take” of the temporary or staffing agency usually 
ranges from 25 to 50 percent of the hourly rate it charges the user firm for 
each hour of a temp worker’s use,49 far above the levels that state 
regulations historically permitted for fees charged by for-profit 
employment agents.50 
Studies spanning several decades document the panoply of abuses and 
problems perpetrated by temp agencies that are either unique to the temp 
industry’s workforce or exacerbated by the industry’s mode of operation.51 
A common complaint of temps is agency favoritism and arbitrary decision-
making in job assignments that belie industry claims that it uses “state of 
the art technology, sophisticated procedures” and skill testing that 
 48. George Gonos, Fee-Splitting Revisited: Concealing Surplus Value in the Temporary 
Employment Relationship, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 589, 596-98, 600-02 (2001). 
 49. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPT., AFL-CIO, TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
AGENCIES IN CONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL 10 (2000) (estimating mark-up at 30-50%); Gonos, supra 
note 48, at 600-03; Shulamit Kahn, The Bottom-Line Impact of Nonstandard Jobs on Companies’ 
Profitability and Productivity, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 2, at 241. 
 50. Compare, for instance, the maximum fees set by various state statutes in 1960 as discussed in 
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 209, STATE LAWS REGULATING 
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 12-16 (1960). 
 51. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10349, A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers 
Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the H. Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 
(1971); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-91-56, WORKERS AT RISK: INCREASED 
NUMBERS IN CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT LACK INSURANCE, OTHER BENEFITS, REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  (1991); see also, e.g., KEVIN HENSON, JUST A TEMP 
(1996); PARKER, supra note 11; ROGERS, supra note 29. For journalistic coverage see, e.g., George 
Getschow, Dirty Work: The Day Laborer’s Toil Is Hard, Pay Minimal, Security Nonexistent. WALL ST. 
J., June 22, 1983, at 1; George Getschow, Dirty Work: Louisiana Labor Camps Supply “Warm Bodies” 
The Oil Business Needs, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1983, at 1. 
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“accurately” matches a temp’s skill set with an appropriate job.52 The 
promise of skills training used to entice workers to join the temporary 
workforce is, in fact, often training of only rudimentary skills and only 
offered during a time when one would ordinarily be working.53 A range of 
problems arise from the fact that temps are not provided a written record of 
the terms they have been promised by the agency, leaving them vulnerable 
to “bait-and-switch” tactics. Consider the promise to match a temp to a 
work assignment of an appropriate skill level. The match may appear 
rational and satisfactory from the vantage point of the user firm, but 
ethnographic data shows that temps are often compelled to accept 
assignments below their skill level if they want to remain in line for the 
possibility of future placement at a higher wage and an appropriate skill 
level.54 More often than not, the temp is neither paid for work performed at 
a higher skill level than that for which she was hired nor rewarded with an 
improved job assignment.55 This kind of “task flexibility” increases the rate 
of exploitation of the temp agency workforce.56 
The exploitation of temp workers is most easily measured by their 
appreciably lower pay when compared to core employees doing the same 
or similar work, and the almost universal absence of employer-paid health 
and retirement benefits.57 According to data from 2005, the most recent 
data available for comparison, the median weekly income for “full-time” 
temporary agency workers is $41458 compared to a median weekly income 
of $653 for full time wage and salary workers.59 Where temps are 
 52. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 31 (quoting promotional material distributed in 1992 by the 
National Association of Temporary and Staffing Services); see also Tim Bartley & Wade T. Roberts, 
Relational Exploitation: The Informal Organization of Day Labor Agencies, 9 WORKING USA: J. LAB. 
& SOC’Y 41 (2006). 
 53. ROGERS, supra note 29 at 35-36. 
 54. Id. at 57-65. 
 55. Id. 
 56. It is not uncommon for highly educated individuals to be hired to fill clerical jobs at low 
hourly rates and nevertheless end up performing jobs which utilize their specialized skills and education 
(for example, to write speeches or provide advice on insurance planning). Id. at 22. 
 57. ARNE KALLEBERG, ET AL., NON-STANDARD WORK, SUBSTANDARD JOBS: FLEXIBLE WORK 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE U.S. — (1997) (6.3% of temp agency workers are provided with health 
insurance by the agency and 3.1% are provided with pension coverage); Steven Hipple & Jay Stewart, 
Earnings and Benefits of Workers In Alternative Work Arrangements, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 
1996, at 46, 48 (5.7% of temp agency workers are provided health insurance by the agency and 2.5% 
are provided pension coverage).  
 58. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, FEBRUARY 2005 tbl. 13, available at <http://www.bls.gov/news. 
release/pdf/conemp.pdf>; see also Courtney von Hippel et al., Operationalizing the Shadow Workforce: 
Toward an Understanding of the Participants in Nonstandard Employment Relationships, in THE 
SHADOW WORKFORCE, supra note 3, at 29, 43 (citing 2005 Bureau of Labor Statistics data). 
 59. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE 
AND SALARY WORKERS: FIRST QUARTER 2005, at 1, available at <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
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integrated into the regular workforce, their hourly wage can range from 
about three-fourths to slightly more than one-half the hourly wage of new 
hires employed directly by the user firm who perform the same or 
comparable work.60 Even when compared to other contingent and non-
standard arrangements, workers deployed by temp agencies receive the 
lowest rates of pay and benefits coverage.61 The overall savings to 
employers are consequently enormous since the rate at which the temp 
agency bills a client firm for its use of a temp is far lower than the user 
firm’s total compensation cost for a new hire.62 
The disparities in pay and benefits suffered by temps are commonly 
cited. What is often missing from the literature however, are two structural 
aspects of the temp agency’s role that are crucial to understanding the 
exploitation of temp workers, and pertinent to our analysis and policy 
recommendations. The first relates to the role of temp agencies as 
gatekeepers to labor markets and the second to their function as contractual 
bargaining agents in triangular employment relationships. 
As a gatekeeper, the temp agency exercises control over access to 
labor markets through two components. The first is contractual: agencies 
restrict and condition the transition to the standard, i.e. “permanent” 
employment relationships desired by most agency workers through the use 
of restrictive covenants contained in their agreements with both workers 
and client firms. Most agencies expressly forbid temps from making any 
attempt to be hired directly by the client firm.63 Throughout the industry, 
substantial fees (referred to as liquidated damages) are charged to client 
firms for the conversion of temps to direct employment with the firm. The 
second component is disingenuous marketing and recruitment. Temp 
agencies present themselves as attractive points of entry into job markets 
that satisfy workers’ desire for upward mobility and solicit workers to join 
the ranks of temps with dubious “temp to perm” advertisements, claiming 
that temporary employment builds skills and relationships that lead to 
permanent, standard jobs.64 The temp industry has intentionally developed 
archives/wkyeng_04212005.pdf> 
 60. See, e.g. Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 383, 401 n.6. 
 61. BENNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 4; STONE, supra note 1, at 69-70. 
 62. Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 383, 401 n.6. 
 63. This practice has led to some states to enact legislation that precludes temp agencies from 
making such agreements. Arizona (ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 25-553 (2008)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 
448.24(6) (2008)), Illinois (820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40 (2008)), and New Mexico (N.M. STAT. § 50-
15-4(D) (2008)) expressly prohibit such restrictions, long common in the temp industry. Florida, Illinois 
and New Mexico do, however, permit a temp agency to collect a placement fee when a worker takes a 
direct-hire job with a user firm. FLA. STAT. § 448.24(6); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 175/40; N.M. STAT. § 
50-15-4(E). 
 64. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 67-68. 
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a discourse in its recruitment materials – what one researcher labels the 
“myth of the full-time job”65 – that hypes temp work as a bridge to full-
time work while, in fact, it operates as a barrier or, at best, a screen66 that 
functions as an obstacle that prevents or delays temp workers from 
transitioning to the standard workforce.67 More often than not, however, 
temps languish in temporary, unbenefited positions for months or, in the 
case of “perma-temps,” for years, because no fixed time period or 
performance criteria exist to determine when or if a worker will be 
converted to “permanent” status. Moreover, many businesses have evolved 
a practice (called “try before you buy”) of only hiring direct employees 
after they have done a stint of indeterminate duration with a particular temp 
agency,68 or of permanently staffing certain job classifications with 
temps.69 The firm’s human resource office expressly tells applicants to sign 
up at the preferred temp agency or “master vendor” if they desire to work 
with the business.70 Increasingly, by virtue of their exclusive contracts with 
employers, temp and staffing agencies stand at the gates of particular firms 
and labor markets as the only way for workers to enter. Thus sheltered 
from pure competition with other agencies, they are able to exercise a great 
deal of power over workers in imposing the terms of employment.71 
The dealings and negotiations between temp agencies and client firms 
set the collective terms of deployment of the temp workforce to the client 
firm. For each job order, agency managers meet or communicate with 
representatives of the client firm to share information on current labor costs 
and exchange proposals concerning the agency’s billing rates and, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the pay rates of the different classes of workers the 
 65. Id. at 67. 
 66. See Erickcek et al., supra note 23, at 379-81. 
 67. See ROGERS, supra note 29, at 67-70. 
 68. See Jamie Peck & Nikolas Theodore, The Business of Contingent Work: Growth And 
Restructuring in Chicago’s Temporary Employment Industry, 12 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 655-74 (1998); 
Cynthia M. Ofstead, Temporary Help Firms as Entrepreneurial Actors, 14 SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 273, 
289 (1999); Susan N. Houseman, Arne L. Kalleberg & George A. Erickcek, The Role of Temporary 
Help Employment in Tight Labor Markets, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 105,122-24 (2003). 
 69. Smith et al., supra note 16, at 665-75 (comments of Stephen Strong). 
 70. See id. at 668-69 (“[t]he employees are called ‘employees’ of Kelly (i.e., Kelly Services), but 
they really are not coming from Kelly . . . the employer (client firm) provides the employees to Kelly. 
Kelly simply  does the service of putting them on Kelly’s payroll.”). See also Danielle van Jaarsveld, 
Nascent Organizing Initiatives Among High-Skilled Contingent Workers: The Microsoft-
Washtech/CWA Case 128-31, Masters Thesis, Cornell University (2000) (copy on file wth authors). 
For further discussion of these types of master vendor agreements, see generally Jan Druker & Celia 
Stanworth, Partnerships and the Private Recruitment Industry, 11 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 73, 73-89 
(2001). 
 71. Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, Who Pays the Price of Brokerage? Transferring Constraint through 
Price Setting in the Staffing Sector, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 291, 293-96 (2007) (describing the “social 
friction” that insulates LMIs from pure competition). 
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agency is being requested to provide. In some high volume contracts, other 
conditions of employment, such as procedures for handling grievances and 
dismissals, are also discussed and decided on. These private “price 
negotiations” are concluded so as to maximize “cost savings” to the client 
firm and a reasonable operating margin and profits for the agency.72 The 
temp agency does not assume these “costs”; rather, they are passed on to 
the workers who are assigned to that client73 in the form of a lower wage 
and reduced or non-existent benefits.74 Once negotiations with the client 
are concluded, the temp agency offers temp workers a pay rate that is a 
percentage of the bill rate received from the client.75 Recent research 
confirms that because of their collusive business ties with valued client 
firms, staffing agencies are able to transfer to temp workers the cost of 
“savings” offered to clients rather than reduce their own margins,76 and 
extract rents above the actual value of their services.77 
The mechanisms of exploitation in the temp agency industry are 
intentionally hidden or obfuscated. The “billing process” by which a temp’s 
terms and conditions of employment are established is controlled by the 
contractual agreement between the agency and the client firm. 78 This 
contract, of course, is completely outside the purview of the temp agency’s 
workforce. Indeed, this information is protected by the temp industry as 
confidential business information.79 Moreover, temp agencies routinely 
prohibit the discussion of pay rates, fail to provide reasons for the 
termination of a temp’s assignment, do not provide the client’s evaluation 
of a temp’s work performance, and, most importantly, block temp workers’ 
access to the agency’s mark-up rates and other terms of its contractual 
agreements with client firms.80 When hired, temps typically face a “take it 
or leave it” proposition on the question of wages. Even at the high end, 
 72. Temp industry advertising aimed at business clients candidly explains that the to-be-
eliminated benefit packages of directly hired employees (health insurance, holiday and sick pay, etc.) 
represent “your (the client’s) savings.” Gonos, supra note 48, at 600-02; see also Fernandez-Mateo, 
supra note 71, at 298-99. Some employers set their “purchase price” for specific classes of labor which 
is then marked down by the agency to arrive at the workers wage. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at 
367-70. In other cases a simple “cost-plus” formula is used, as when staffing agencies engaged in 
“payrolling” add their standard mark-up to the hourly wage paid at the time of the agreement. See also 
BARLEY & KUNDA, supra note 39, at 151-56. 
 73. Fernandez-Mateo supra note 71, at 293-97, 304-08. 
 74. Gonos,  supra note 48, at 600-02. 
 75. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 299. 
 76. Id. at 312-15. 
 77. Id. at 293-97, 312. 
 78. Id. at 310. 
 79. Joseph B. Darby, The Untouchable Topic: Agencies Explain Why They Charge Fees and What 
Is Reasonable, CONTRACT PROFESSIONAL, July-Aug. 1998, at 37-45. 
 80. ROGERS, supra note 29, at 120. 
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they very rarely get to negotiate pay rates.81 Indeed, these dynamics and 
problematic conditions cut across income and occupational lines. The temp 
work paradigm engenders exploitation in labor markets of skilled 
professionals82 as well as in low-wage, unskilled labor markets where 
exploitation may be exacerbated in numerous ways. Among the most 
egregious practices is the failure to pay statutory overtime rates.83 In 
manufacturing and construction work it can be compounded by extra 
charges for safety equipment, transportation, or check cashing.84 Thus, for 
most temp workers, real bargaining power to affect the wages they are 
offered – what the NLRA aptly refers to as the “actual liberty of contract” 
of employees85 – is practically nil. The client firm’s bottom line – what it is 
willing to pay the temp agency – effectively dictates the maximum wage 
that the agency is willing to pay its temps, since the staffing firm has little 
or no ability or inclination to absorb wage increases not backed by the 
client firm.86 
In short, there are only nominal market forces to counter the 
inexorable drive to lower wages and reduced benefits for workers 
employed through the for-profit temp and staffing industry. Without legal 
reforms that encourage operational transparency of the temporary staffing 
industry and organization to achieve a strong collective voice for temps, it 
is difficult to imagine a reversal of the second-class status of workers 
employed through for-profit LMIs. 
D. Obstacles to a Focused Inquiry on the Legal Status of the Temp Agency 
and other For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries 
Stephen Befort has observed that all contingent and nonstandard work 
 81. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 299. 
 82. These conditions have spurred complaints and concerted activity among high-end temps to 
defend work standards and terms of deployment See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY, 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 147-50 (2003) (providing a 
socio-legal analysis of Silicon Valley’s labor market where temp agencies are a vital component of the 
workforce, deploying between 7 and 10 percent of the workforce); see also ROGERS, supra note 29, at 
12, 127-50 (noting that as early as 1995, Forbes magazine reported that Butler International, a “high-
end” temporary employment business, routinely leased engineers, computer programmers and managers 
for six to nine month assignments and that lawyers as well as secretaries are mailroom clerks are now 
“for rent” from temp agencies). 
 83. Author interviews with temps in scientific laboratory work (on file with author). 
 84. Kerr & Dole, supra note 39, at 87, 93-95. 
 85. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Staffing agencies also deliberately obstruct workers’ access to 
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, further reducing their bargaining power and 
constraining their freedom of movement. 
 86. J.G. Axelrod, Who’s the Boss? Employee Leasing and the Joint Employer Relationship, 3 
LAB. LAW. 853 (1987); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relationship, 74 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1527 (1996). 
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relationships occupy a “black-hole in the legal universe.”87 The temporary 
staffing industry’s deployment of workers to client firms certainly occupies 
the center of this “veritable regulation-free zone.”88 A major determinant of 
temp agency workers’ second-class status is the legally invisible system of 
contracting practices used by the staffing industry. As discussed above, the 
staffing firms and their clients exchange information on labor costs and 
operating expenses in order to arrive at billing rates and wage levels that 
afford the client firm “cost savings” and the agency its operating margin.89 
In effect, the system of hidden negotiations and “mark-ups” takes what was 
formerly part of the employees’ share of total income and literally 
redistributes or splits it between the agency and client firm. This 
paradigmatic, but barely recognized, wage-setting process by which the 
staffing agency and its client profit from temp placement is not a legally 
cognizable injury and operates outside the boundaries of employment law. 
Absent government regulation, the temp industry’s normative mode of 
operation will continue to extract a hidden fee or markup from its 
workforce for the “privilege” of being deployed into the labor market. 
For a number of reasons, these mediating and job brokering dynamics 
have escaped legal scrutiny. First, most critical legal analysis of 
nonstandard employment relationships has focused on the exploitation of 
temps hired directly by employers, i.e. without a market intermediary. 
Nonstandard workers hired directly by employers comprise the majority of 
contingent workers.90 They have their own unique set of issues that arise 
from often being legally misclassified as independent contractors and 
deprived of the panoply of legal protections that workplace law provides to 
employees.91 Second, the taxonomy of commercial LMIs is complex.92 
 87. Befort, supra note 13, at 164-65. Even labor market analysts and human resource scholars 
who part ways on the benefits of using temp agencies agree that government regulation is “hopelessly 
out of touch” with the changes wrought by the growth of the non-standard workforce. See Charles 
Heckscher, HR Strategy and Nonstandard Work: Dualism Versus True Mobility, in NONSTANDARD 
WORK, supra note 2, at 267, 267-90. 
 88. Befort, supra note 13, at 154. 
 89. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 598. 
 90. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-76, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE 
EDWARD M. KENNEDY AND THE HONORABLE ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, U.S. SENATE: CONTINGENT 
WORKERS: INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF THE REST OF THE WORKFORCE 14, tbl. 1 
(2000), available at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00076.pdf> (reporting the number of agency 
temps as 1,188,000 of 39,271,000 contingent workers). 
 91. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 279-81; Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent 
Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory 
Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999). 
 92. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible and Triangular 
Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 112-15 (2003) 
(outlining the problematic configuration of labor markets utilizing commercial LMIs). 
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Consider, for instance, that temp agencies often operate in narrow labor 
markets deploying only highly paid engineers, professionals, and 
managerial staff, while other agencies focus solely on semi-skilled clerical 
staff, manual laborers, or welfare-to-work recipients.93 Consequently, the 
shared characteristics that would ground uniform regulation of temp 
agencies and other forms of commercial LMIs is not readily apparent. 
Third, when the plight of temp agency workers is examined, the focus is 
often on establishing the client firm as an employer of the agency worker in 
order to bring the temp worker within the zone of legal protections and 
rights afforded to the client firm’s standard workforce.94 These important 
efforts to use a joint-employer doctrine and other theories to improve the 
conditions of temp workers by arguing that temps have two employers has 
met with mixed results in the courts.95 Moreover, the joint-employer 
approach does little to alter or even explain the exploitation that arises from 
the temp agency’s mediating and matchmaking role in triangular 
employment relationships. 
As it stands, the nation’s workplace laws lack a vocabulary that would 
permit the temp agency and other commercial LMIs to be considered as 
something other than employers, much less capture the exploitive dynamics 
of triangular employment relationships. Because the temp agency is only 
legally understood to be an employer, its mediating role largely falls 
outside the framework of workplace law, and its role as a strategic wedge 
in the battle over flexibility and deregulation of the workplace96 remains 
unchallenged. Reconceptualizing a legal framework in which to analyze 
and regulate the temporary staffing industry and other commercial LMIs 
requires, at least in part, a step “back to the future” to locate a lost legal 
vocabulary and understanding of profit-driven LMIs. 
 93. For example, on the last day of New York Mayor Rudolph Guliani’s administration, 3500 
welfare-to-work recipients working at union wages for the New York City Parks Department were 
transferred to a temporary staffing agency, taking an immediate pay cut of $1.43 per hour. See Nina 
Bernstein, City Fires 3,500 Former Welfare Recipients, N.Y.TIMES, Jan 5, 2002, at B3. 
 94. E.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 
N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 76 (2004). 
 95. See discussion infra Part VI; Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the NLRB’s Treatment of Temporary 
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (2000) 
(examining various theories and outcomes in cases utilizing the joint employer doctrine); see also, e.g., 
Chao v. Gotham Registry, Inc., 514 F.3d 280, 280-91 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that constriction on 
employer’s ability to control its nurses, who were assigned to work at employer’s hospital-clients, did 
not exempt it from overtime pay provisions of FLSA, notwithstanding the nature of its business in 
assigning its employees to work elsewhere, which posed practical difficulties in enforcing its formal 
rule against unapproved overtime). 
 96. See Jamie Peck & Nik Theodore, Temped Out? Industry Rhetoric, Labor Regulation, and 
Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing Business, 23 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 143 
(2002) (applying this analysis to the temp industry’s role in union-avoidance). 
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III. LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES DURING THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM 
The ills of today’s non-standard employment relationships are not 
without historical antecedent. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
comparable levels of vulnerability and similar social problems were 
experienced by workers who sought jobs through profit-driven employment 
agencies. This gave rise to strict and comprehensive (albeit only partially 
effective) state regulation of private employment agencies. Nothing 
comparable exists today. Efforts to regulate the exploitive practices of the 
contemporary commercial staffing industry are only beginning to gain 
traction. The next two sections explain the important lessons to be derived 
from working class campaigns and legal regulations that attempted to 
address the abuses perpetrated by fee-charging employment agencies 
during the rise and consolidation of industrial capitalism. 
A. Employment Sharks and Padrones: Crudely Connecting Labor and 
Capital, 1880-1917 
The expansion of industrial capitalism in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, not unlike the closing decades of the twentieth century, 
was characterized by rapid economic transition and high levels of labor 
market volatility.97 All manner of private labor agents flourished in 
response to the soaring demand for casual labor created by a booming 
industrial economy.98 The commercial employment agency business, the 
parent of the modern temp industry, emerged from the job brokering 
practices of “immigrant middlemen”99 who orchestrated the importation of 
foreign contract laborers in the decades following the Civil War. These 
immigrant agents, or padrones, received commissions from railroad, 
mining, agricultural, and industrial interests to lure contract labor from the 
agent’s country of origin – Greece, Italy and other European countries as 
well as Mexico and Japan – with the promise of free passage and jobs.100 
Padrones also served as on-the-job overseers that mediated all aspects of 
the workers’ lives, creating the circumstances for the most lucrative part of 
 97. JOSHUA L. ROSENBLOOM, LOOKING FOR WORK, SEARCHING FOR WORKERS: AMERICAN 
LABOR MARKETS DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 74-78 (2002) (summarizing the expansion of public 
labor exchanges from 1900 until 1915). 
 98. See, e.g., WALTER LICHT, GETTING WORK: PHILADELPHIA, 1840-1950, at 123-24 (1992). 
 99. See generally Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOC. REV. 583 
(1973). 
 100. See GUNTHER PECK, REINVENTING FREE LABOR: PADRONES AND IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN 
THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST, 1880-1930, at 1-4 (2000). 
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their business. They overcharged for train fares, rented the shanties in 
which the men lived, sold them groceries and supplies, and exacted 
additional fees for “services” of all kinds.101 
After 1885, when federal law prohibited the importation of foreign 
“contract labor,” 102 large commercial agencies gradually replaced the 
padrone at the top of the employment agency business. Immigrant agents 
re-focused their recruitment activities on urban centers in the U.S., and the 
padrone now became a “middleman” between desperate immigrant 
populations and the commercial Anglo-operated employment offices.103 
Around 1890, major urban centers experienced what Frances Kellor 
described as a “spasmodic multiplication” of employment agency 
activity.104 Nationwide demand for manual labor – railroad and highway 
construction, harvesting, logging, and other basic industries – fueled the 
growth of “general” labor agencies, the largest segment of the business.105 
Their prime role was the recruitment of unskilled “day labor,”106 a huge 
mobile segment of the workforce whose jobs were seasonal or irregular as 
a result of fluctuations in the economy. Large commercial agencies holding 
the major orders, most headquartered in Chicago, were supplied with 
workers by smaller, more specialized offices, and by multifarious networks 
of individual agents, including immigrant middlemen of various 
nationalities and small entrepreneurs doing business from their positions as 
local bankers, ticket agents, or saloon keepers.107 Thus, the “drifting class” 
that moved incessantly from job to job depended on this diverse network of 
LMIs to obtain work.108 
The employment agency business in all its forms was a crucial part of 
 101. See id. at 49-81; FRANCES A. KELLOR, OUT OF WORK: A STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 135-41, 
184-93, 393 (revised ed. 1915); DON LESCOHEIR & ELIZABETH BRANDEIS, WORKING CONDITIONS AND 
LABOR LEGISLATION, VOL. III: HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932,  at 185-87 
(1935);  DAVID MONTGOMERY, FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 58-111 (1987). 
 102. An Act to Prohibit the Importation and Migration of Foreigners and Aliens under Contract or 
Agreement to Perform Labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia, ch. 164, 
23 Stat. 332 (1885) (repealed 1952); see generally Prescott Hall, The Federal Contract Labor Law, 11 
HARV. L. REV. 525, 525-27 (1898). 
 103. See LESCOHEIR & BRANDEIS, supra note 101. 
 104. KELLOR, supra note 101, at 393; see also TOMÁS MARTINEZ, THE HUMAN MARKETPLACE: AN 
EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 16 (1976). 
 105. See generally KELLOR, supra note 101, at 157-270 (providing perhaps the best overview of the 
diversity of the employment agency business at the turn of the century); see also ROSENBLOOM, supra 
note 97, at 64-70. 
 106. Agency workers were generally not skilled craft workers, who were supplied though unions, 
or factory operatives; instead, they were easily recruited at the factory gates or through kinship and 
neighborhood networks. See DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE NEW 
FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1920, at 79-100 (1975). 
 107. DON D. LESCOHIER, THE LABOR MARKET 146-150, 153-58 (1923). 
 108. MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 87. 
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this era’s churning labor market, engaging in a commodity exchange – the 
simple sale of labor power – on a vast scale, unrestricted by any 
government regulation. Described in today’s terms, industrial capitalism in 
the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century America rested on a 
flexible, “high-velocity” labor market.109 At the turn of the twentieth 
century, from what information is available, licensed agencies alone must 
have handled several million job seekers a year.110 “Inadequate as these 
figures are,” stated one economist at the turn of the twentieth century, “they 
yet serve in some degree to [. . .] give an idea of the vast sums that are paid 
annually [in fees to employment agencies] by the unemployed for the 
purpose of securing employment.”111 A federal commission estimated that 
by 1914, between 3,000 and 5,000 private fee-charging agencies were 
operating nationally.112 
B. Responses to Exploitation: Labor Organizing and States’ Efforts to 
Regulate For-Profit Employment Agencies in the Shadow of Freedom of 
Contract 
From the late nineteenth century until World War II, worker protests 
and a constant stream of public criticism targeted widespread abuses 
perpetrated by fee-charging private employment agencies. At one point, as 
labor radicals organized against employment agents and successive waves 
of federal and state public hearings issued scathing reports excoriating the 
private employment agencies, public condemnation of the industry called 
into question the right of employment agencies to operate. During this time, 
state legislation regulating fee-charging employment agencies proliferated 
and three Supreme Court cases addressed the question of whether it was 
proper for the states to regulate profit-driven employment agencies. 
1. Don’t Buy Jobs! – The Wobblies Take on the Employment Sharks 
In the early 1900s important labor struggles were aimed at ending the 
employment agencies’ exploitation of temporary and seasonal workers and 
its lock on entry to important labor markets. Consider, for example, a 1909 
 109. See ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A 
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET xv-xxi (2003) (describing the high-velocity labor market of 
California’s Silicon Valley at the turn of the twenty-first century). 
 110. E.L. Bogart, Public Employment Offices in the United States and Germany, 14 Q.J. ECON. 
341, 344-45 (1900). 
 111. Id. at 345. 
 112. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND 
TESTIMONY, SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CREATED BY 
THE ACT OF AUGUST 23, 1912, at 109 (1916). 
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campaign against the employment agencies led by the Industrial Workers 
of the World (IWW) in Spokane, Washington, the largest western center of 
migratory labor.113 At that time, a booming business in logging, railroads 
and construction was run on temporary labor deployed by Spokane’s 
private employment agents.114 Congregating outside employment agency 
offices, organizers mounted soapboxes calling for a boycott of the agencies 
derisively branded by the wobbly organizers as “employment sharks.”115 
Incensed at being fleeced by private agencies, this agitation resonated 
among the workers, commonly called “floaters.”116 A central demand of 
these workers was the abolition of fee-charging by employment agents and 
the establishment of free public or union-operated employment offices.117 
In response, the employment agents formed the Associated Agencies 
of Spokane and persuaded the municipal council to ban “street-
speaking.”118 This sparked a legendary IWW free speech fight. “Wobblies” 
descended on Spokane and immediately defied the ban on labor 
soapboxing. Campaigning under the slogan “Don’t Buy Jobs,” the IWW 
led street protests against the “labor sharks” with the aim of extinguishing 
the “vermin.”119 Police arrests of more than 600 protesters only fueled the 
struggle. The prisoners organized and carried out a hunger strike while 
citizens, the American Federation of Labor and the Socialist Party joined 
the protest. The authorities surrendered. The ordinance was rescinded, 
prisoners released, and the right of the workers to rent halls and engage in 
labor agitation on the streets was established. On top of that, the local 
authorities revoked the licenses of nineteen hated employment agencies.120 
2. Progressive Reformers’ Fight to Regulate Exploitive Employment 
Agents 
Labor protests provided the backdrop for an investigation of the 
abusive practices of employment agency industry by the U.S. Commission 
on Industrial Relations (CIR).121 From 1912 until 1915, the CIR held 
 113. PHILIP FONER, 4 HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 177-85 (1965). 
 114. Id. at 177-78. 
 115. Id. at 178. 
 116. Id. at 177, 179-82. 
 117. Id. at 178, 182-83. 
 118. Id. at 178-79. 
 119. Id.; SELIG PERLMAN & PHILIP TAFT, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-
1932: LABOR MOVEMENTS 236-37 (1935); see also FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS: IWW FREE 
SPEECH FIGHTS AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS 30-31 (Philip S. Foner, ed., 1981). 
 120. FONER, supra note 113, at 178-83; see FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS, supra note 119, at 
32-34. 
 121. U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112, at 29. 
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hearings on unemployment and temporary work in twelve industrial 
centers. Across the nation,122 sheaves of testimony by workers catalogued 
the standard industry abuses: excessive fees, collusion with employers and 
various forms of extortion and misrepresentation. Fee-charging practices of 
employment agencies, in particular, became a widely recognized “social 
evil” in early twentieth century labor markets.123 Private agents earned the 
label of “employment sharks” by charging exorbitant fees and sending 
workers to non-existent jobs. Employment agencies and employers 
colluded in “fee-splitting,” bilking workers by intentionally promoting high 
turnover, hiring and quickly dismissing workers to maximize the number of 
fees collected.124 The CIR concluded that the private employment agency 
business “as a whole reeks with fraud, extortion, and flagrant abuses of 
every kind.”125 
Legislative efforts to curtail abusive practices by the employment 
agencies proceeded along two paths – a more radical approach which 
sought to abolish fee-charging employment agencies and a reformist effort 
to strictly regulate the employment agency business. The IWW-led 
Spokane campaign spearheaded the abolitionist approach.126 Reports 
 122. Between 1887 and 1914, no fewer than eleven states held hearings and issued scathing reports 
excoriating the private employment agency business. UDO SAUTTER, THREE CHEERS FOR THE 
UNEMPLOYED: GOVERNMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 56-57 (1992). 
 123. See generally Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359-75 (1928) (Stone, J. dissenting); Adams 
v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-611(1917) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 124. As fee-splitting was explained by the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915: 
The foreman agrees to hire men of a certain employment agent on condition that one-
forth or one-half of every fee collected from men whom he hires be given to him. This 
leads the foreman to discharge men constantly in order to have more men hired through 
the agent and more fees collected. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GROWTH OF LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
140 (1962). 
 125. Quoted in WILLIAM J. BREEN, LABOR MARKET POLITICS AND THE GREAT WAR: THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE STATES, AND THE FIRST U.S. EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, 1907-1933, at 183-
84 (1997). Even the nation’s first Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, noted “a tendency toward 
dishonesty in connection with the very nature of the business itself.” Id. at 144. The CIR’s final report 
recommended a national labor distribution system for migrant workers, free transportation for those 
who secured employment through public employment agencies, and federal licensing and regulation of 
private agencies. CINDY HAHAMOVICH, THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR: ATLANTIC COAST 
FARMWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870-1945, at 75-76 (1997). 
 126. By the turn of the twentieth century, attempts to abolish private agencies through law were 
also made in Idaho and “stringent regulatory law” was adopted in Wisconsin (right to refuse a license 
when agency deemed to be unnecessary in a given city) and Minnesota (damages in cases of fraud, 
municipal licensing fee of $100 and posting of $10,000 bond). LESCHOHEIR & BRANDEIS, supra note 
101, at 186.  The anti-employment agency sentiment was echoed in global forums. The International 
Labour Organization adopted a “recommendation” in 1919 “to prohibit the establishment of 
employment agencies which charge fees,” by which time several nations, e.g., France, the Netherlands 
and Canada, had already resolved to abolish private agencies. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. 
ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 8, 11, 21 (4th revised ed. Augustus M. Kelley 1967) 
(1916). 
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produced by the Washington State Department of Labor, based on workers’ 
testimony, pointedly criticized employment agencies for charging 
excessive fees, fee-splitting, and other fraudulent and abusive conduct. In 
1913-14, a widespread perception that private fee-charging agencies 
exacerbated rising unemployment led Washington citizens to pass a 
referendum, the “Abolishing Employment Agency Measure,” outlawing the 
collection of employment agency fees from workers.127 The Measure still 
allowed agents to collect fees from business clients, but it was widely 
believed that the Measure would put commercial agents out of business 
because the prevailing business model was for employment agents to 
collect “registration fees” from workers “up front” at the time of their 
application for work. Like other opponents of private agencies across the 
country, promoters of the initiative favored a free public system of labor 
exchange, a project already underway in Washington.128 
The right of states to use their police powers to regulate for-profit 
employment agencies was sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1916.129 However, one year later and three years after the Washington state 
measure was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adams v. Tanner,130 
struck down the law. Applying the Court’s notorious liberty of contract 
doctrine,131 Adams held that the Washington ballot referendum 
unconstitutionally trampled the agencies’ Fourteenth Amendment right to 
engage in business and freely contract with those who chose to use the 
agent’s services. A five-justice majority reasoned that since “appellants’ 
occupation as agents for workers could not exist unless the latter pay for 
what they receive,” the Washington statute was “one of prohibition, not 
regulation.”132 Justice Louis Brandeis’s vigorously dissented, presenting 
detailed studies and statistics to demonstrate that the evils of fee-charging 
 127. The referendum stated that 
the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or 
with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of 
imposition and extortion and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state . . . It 
shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to 
demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or 
from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing 
him or her with employment or with information leading thereto. 
Quoted in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 591 (1917). 
 128. Adams, 244 U.S. at 614; LESCOHIER, supra note 107, at 164-76; LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, 
supra note 101, at 192-197; see William M. Leiserson, The Theory of Public Employment Offices and 
the Principles of Their Practical Administration, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 28, 36-46 (1914) (describing 
Wisconsin’s public system). 
 129. Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916) 
 130. 244 U.S. at 586-97. 
 131. See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 132. Adams, 244 U.S. at 593. 
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agencies were “inherent and ineradicable.”133 He concluded that 
Washington voters could constitutionally outlaw fee-charging even if the 
law did force private employment agencies out of business, since 
prohibition of a business was not outside the scope of state power when the 
targeted evil could not be otherwise prevented. Justice Brandeis’s opinion 
echoed the widely held view that the very notion of a worker having to buy 
a job was “foreign to the spirit of American freedom and opportunity.”134 
Adams’ application of Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine 
circumscribed the arena of employment agency regulation for more than 
three decades. But Adams did not prevent states from imposing fee ceilings 
on employment agency rate schedules, as Brazee v. Michigan squarely held 
that employment agencies were subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the states.135 So even after Adams, the American Association 
for Labor Legislation (AALL), the standard bearer of the Progressive 
movement’s effort to eliminate the more savage features of the labor 
market, continued to call for strict state regulation of private employment 
agencies.136 The AALL’s call for strict regulation of private agencies was 
coupled with reform proposals to develop and expand a free, efficient 
system of public employment offices that would in short order drive out the 
dishonest private operators.137 Public disdain for the exploitive character of 
the private employment agency remained part of the dialogue about the ills 
of unregulated industrial capitalism during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.138 
 133. Id. at 606. 
 134. Adams, 244 U.S. at 602-03 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. COMMISSION ON 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112). 
 135. 241 U.S. 340, 343 (1916) (“The general nature of the [employment agency] business is such 
that unless regulated many persons may be exposed to misfortunes . . .”). 
 136. See, e.g., John B. Andrews, Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Must Be Effectively 
Regulated, 19 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 367, 367-70 (1929); George H. Trafton, Employment Agencies 
Officially Exposed: Sworn Testimony Shows Urgent Need of State Action, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 27, 
27-36 (1930). 
 137. The movement for free, state-wide public employment offices began in Ohio in 1890. By 
World War I, nearly 100 municipal and state-run public agencies were operating in twenty-six states. 
See BREEN, supra note 125; KELLOR supra note 101, at 299-353; LESCOHIER & BRANDEIS, supra note 
101, at 192-209; PAUL T. RINGENBACH, TRAMPS AND REFORMERS 1873-1916: THE DISCOVERY OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK 48-52 (1973); ROSENBLOOM, supra note 94, at 74-78 (summarizing 
expansion of public labor exchanges from 1900 until 1915); Bogart, supra note 110, at 341-66; 
Leiserson, supra note 128; Udo Sautter, North American Government Labor Agencies Before World 
War One: A Cure for Unemployment?, 24 LAB. HISTORY 366, 366-67 (1983). 
 138. Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 363-65 (1928) (Stone, J., dissenting) (reiterating that the 
findings of “thirty years . . . of repeated investigations, official and unofficial, and of extensive public 
comment, afford a substantial basis for the conclusion . . . that the business is peculiarly subject to 
abuses related to fee-charging.”); see also George Gonos, “Never a Fee!: The Miracle of the 
Postmodern Temporary Help and Staffing Agency, 4 WORKING USA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y, Dec. 2000, at 9, 
19 . 
FREEMAN AND GONOS  11/20/2009  11:11:02 AM 
2009] TAMING THE EMPLOYMENT SHARKS 127 
 
By 1914, at least twenty-five states had some form of regulation on 
the books (though a third of these laws were considered inadequate).139 By 
1928, Progressives had enacted and strengthened legislation in thirty-nine 
states regulating the private employment agency.140 Most statutes contained 
detailed provisions governing the fee agencies charged workers in order to 
address the “the very fact [that] fee-charging carries with it a dangerous 
temptation to abuse and fraud.”141 The express goal was to make the fee 
charged to the worker – no matter what its form – transparent and subject 
to reasonable limits as a means of limiting the rate of exploitation of those 
who pay another for access to the labor market because, “the agencies, left 
to themselves, very generally charge extortionate fees.”142 Hence, laws 
either placed ceilings on fees or required that fee schedules be posted or 
filed with the state.143 Most of these states outlawed collusive fee-splitting, 
the practice used by agencies and employers to share in the fees charged to 
workers.144 Agencies were required to keep records, open to inspection, of 
all placements made and fees charged, and receipts had to be provided to 
workers.145 Many state laws mandated refunds of fees (registration fees and 
transportation costs could also be recovered) when jobs were not obtained 
or turned out to be of an unusually short duration.146 Demanding extra 
charges for “favors”, i.e., charging fees for any service other than for 
furnishing employment, was made illegal.147 
Employment agency statutes provided an expansive definition of the 
fee the agencies charged workers, and considered all forms of employment 
agency activity148 subject to fee ceilings. The New Jersey statute enacted in 
 139. Leiserson, supra note 128. 
 140. Ribnick, 277 U.S. at 370, n.13 (Stone, J., dissenting); KELLOR, supra note 101, at 354 
(providing summaries of state laws governing employments agencies in the early twentieth century); 
Andrews, supra note 136, at 367-70. 
 141. Ribnick, 277 U.S. at 364, n.1 (Stone, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 142. Id. at 365. 
 143. As of 1928, twenty-one states limited the total fees charged by employment agencies. Ribnik, 
277 U.S. at 371-72 & nn.13-18 (Stone, J., dissenting); see also DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF  LAB., BULLETIN NO. 57, PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES: LAWS RELATING TO THEIR 
REGULATION – AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1943 (1943). 
 144. See KELLOR, OUT OF WORK, supra note 101, at 366 (as early as 1904, the time of publication 
of the first edition of this book, ten states had outlawed fee-splitting.) 
 145. Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 371-72; DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143. 
 146. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143, at 12. 
 147. See, e.g., id. at 109 (New Jersey limited charges to those authorized by permitted fee 
schedule). 
 148. For example, 
[t]he term “employment agency” . . . shall mean and include the business of procuring or 
offering to procure help or employment . . . whether such business is conducted in a 
building or on the street or elsewhere . . . where a fee or privilege or commission is 
exacted, charged or received directly or indirectly for procuring or assisting or promising 
to procure employment  . . . of any kind . . .” 
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1918 covered fees received by an agency “directly or indirectly . . . whether 
such is collected from the applicant for employment or the applicant for 
help.”149 The statute defined a “fee” as 
any payment of money, or the promise to pay money, or the excess of 
money received by any person furnishing employment or employees 
over what he has paid for transportation, transfer or [sic] baggage or 
lodging for any applicant for employment; it shall also mean and include 
the difference between the amount of money received by any person who 
furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid by him to said employees . 
. . .150 
A longstanding Massachusetts statute provided than an agency “shall 
not receive or accept any money from a person seeking employment 
through the agency of such office unless employment of the kind demanded 
is furnished.”151 In essence, the legal definition of the agency fee 
comported with the economic reality of how a certain segment of the 
employment agency business made a profit. For agents that collected 
money from employers and paid wages out of that amount to workers, the 
fee constituted a “mark-up,” i.e., the difference between the amount the 
wholesale labor broker charges the employer for each worker and the 
amount the agency pays the worker.152 Early statutory definitions of fee-
charging drew no distinction between fees charged for so-called 
“permanent” placements and temporary placements.153 
Other provisions of state laws regulating fee-charging employment 
agencies typically set licensing fees and criminalized the operation of 
employment services without a license.154 The statutes required proof that 
agency operators were of “good moral character,” and required bonding 
sufficient for applicants to recover for loss or damage arising from 
violations.155 Sixteen different types of fraudulent employment agency 
practices were identified and banned. These included the use of misleading 
advertising,156 sending applicants to non-existent jobs,157 operating an 
1918 N.J. Laws 823. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 1918 N.J. Laws 822-23. 
 151. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 43 (1921). For the text of the 1921 code, see http:// 
www.archive. org/stream/tercentenaryedit02mass#page/1719/mode/1up.  
 152. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1928). 
 153. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140 §§ 41, 43, 44 (1921) (making no distinction in the type of 
employment concerned, but providing for a refund if the employment is not what was promised and a 
partial refund if the employment is terminated within ten days). 
 154. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 143, at 14-15. 
 155. Id. at 15. 
 156. Id.at 328 (e.g. REV. CODE MONTANA ch. 191, §4171 (1935)). 
 157. Id. at 355 (e.g. N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 189 (McKinney 1930)). 
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agency in conjunction with a lodging place, restaurant, or saloon,158 
referring women or children for immoral employment,159 inducing persons 
to quit a job, and holding an employee’s baggage until fees were paid.160 
Statutory provisions also required that workers be informed of labor 
disputes so as to allow them to avoid functioning as strikebreakers.161 In 
sum, the laws were extensive and provided remedies for victims and 
criminal penalties for agents that violated the law. 
Employer associations and the private employment agency business 
fought these reforms, weakening and fragmenting the regulatory 
environment. State enforcement of employment agency laws and efforts to 
establish alternative, local public employment offices were undermined by 
pro-employer groups that made sure these state regulatory activities were 
underfunded. Moreover, absent a federal law regulating private agencies 
(and a federally coordinated system of labor exchanges), the highly mobile, 
interstate character of the labor market made any real reform of the private 
employment agency business unlikely.162 Consequently, the private 
employment agency business thrived even as public outrage over rampant 
abuses continued to fuel calls for stricter regulation. Through the 1920s, 
private, fee-collecting employment agencies were pervasive in the 
chronically disorganized urban labor markets of America.163 Nevertheless, 
during this era, there was widespread support for Justice Brandeis’ claim 
that, the very notion of a worker having to buy a job was “foreign to the 
spirit of American freedom and opportunity.”164 
Ultimately, substantive due process doctrine undermined even the 
states’ regulatory efforts to curtail fee-charging, the most problematic 
feature of the employment agencies. In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
 158. Id.at 234 (e.g. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, § 87 (1935)). 
 159. Id. at 108 (e.g. 1918 N.J. Laws 830) 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 255 (e.g. 1927 Ind. Acts ch. 25, § 12 (currently codified at IND. CODE 25-16-1-2 
(2008))). 
 162. Political pressure brought by the employment agency trade associations and the National 
Association of Manufacturers would delay for twenty years the establishment of a federally sponsored 
employment service. When a federal employment service was finally established by the Wagner-Peyser 
Act in 1933, the same interests would work to keep it a weak competitor of private agencies and shape 
it according to their own needs. Significantly, however, the Wagner-Peyser Act establishing the USES 
prohibited the referral of job applicants to private fee-charging agencies, a ban that was only removed in 
the 1980s by the Job Partnership Training Act. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 598 & n.61. 
 163. IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-1933-THE LEAN YEARS 
239 (1960). New York City was serviced by more than one thousand agencies, Chicago over three 
hundred. Bernstein summarized their modus operandi as follows: “Frequently run by crooks” the for-
profit employment agency was “distinguished by extortionate fees, kickbacks to foreman, inducement 
of discharges to increase business, white slavery, and blacklisting of union members.” Id. 
 164. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 604 (1917) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (quoting U.S. 
COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 112). 
FREEMAN AND GONOS  11/20/2009  11:11:02 AM 
130 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 13:nn 
 
in Ribnik v. McBride165 that New Jersey’s law placing ceilings on agency 
fees was unconstitutional price fixing in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause.166 Reversing its holding in Brazee v. 
Michigan, the Court outlawed the statutory ceilings on agency fees then in 
place in twenty-nine states.167 Although forced to shift their strategy 
following Ribnik, reformers remained focused on the evils of agencies 
charging workers fees to gain access to the labor market. States continued 
to license employment agencies and required private agents to post their fee 
schedules in a “conspicuous place” in their offices and/or file them with the 
appropriate state labor agency.168 Similarly, Ribnik’s limitations did not 
stop state labor departments169 and the U.S. Congress170 from investigating 
and exposing widely prevalent abuses of workers by private employment 
agents prior to World War II. 
IV. THE REGULATION OF LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES: FROM THE 
NEW DEAL TO THE INDUSTRIAL PLURALIST ERA 
Ultimately, it was the consolidation of Fordism, with its increased 
reliance on internal labor markets and personnel departments on the one 
hand, and the rise of industrial unionism, on the other, that signaled a 
reversal of fortune of the for-profit employment agency business. By the 
eve of the Second World War, the profit-driven employment agency was 
being challenged by the growing presence of the union hiring hall model, 
 165. 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
 166. Id. at 363-65. 
 167. Id. at 371-72. 
 168. Andrews, supra note 136, at 399-403; Herman Oliphant, A Decision in the Light of Fact, 19 
AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 95, 95-96 (1929). 
 169. The New York State Industrial Commission held widely publicized hearings in 1929 and 
found approximately 1200 private agencies operating in New York City, making an estimated two 
million placements yearly. The Commission concluded that the system of municipal regulation of 
private employment agencies then in effect was woefully inadequate. Official Commission Reveals 
Unemployment Agency Abuses, Recommends Strict Control by New Legislation, 19 AM. LAB. LEGIS. 
REV. 270, 270-72 (1929); Frances Perkins, State Regulation of Private Employment Agencies, 20 AM. 
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 301, 301-03 (1930); Henry D. Sayer, State Control of Job Agencies 20 AM. LAB. 
LEGIS. REV. 369, 369-71 (1930); Trafton, supra note 136, at 27-36; George H. Trafton, New York Fails 
to Act, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 138, 138-39 (1930). 
 170. At the conclusion of its 1929 hearings on the causes of unemployment, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Education and Labor condemned the practices of profit-driven private employment 
agencies and called for a system of public employment exchanges to eliminate petty graft and 
exploitation of vulnerable workers. The Senate Committee Report stated that the 
burden of assisting the unemployed to find work should be borne by organized society 
through the maintenance of efficient public employment exchanges [which] should 
replace private exchanges. Private employment exchanges which operate for profit and 
solely for profit, present a situation where there are conditions conducive to petty graft. 
Such practice at the expense of the unemployed is a crime which should not be tolerated. 
Andrews, supra note 136, at 367-70 (emphasis added). 
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an alternative labor market intermediary that was gaining ground in skilled 
and unskilled labor markets characterized by short-term employment and 
high mobility. The union-initiated hiring hall utilized hiring practices and 
fostered employment outcomes that were correctives to those used by the 
employment agency business (i.e., fair procedures for assigning work, 
institutionalized training (apprenticeship) programs and job ladders). 
Further, the hiring hall ended the agents’ collusion with employers and 
represented workers’ interests in negotiating the terms of employment. In a 
few short decades, the union hiring hall became the dominant intermediary 
on the waterfront and in the construction, warehousing and entertainment 
industries; the private employment agency was reduced to a minor actor in 
the labor market, limited primarily to deploying surplus employees to 
clerical and other “white collar” office jobs.171 This section explores this 
important shift in the functioning of LMIs and the rise of regulatory 
regimes that came to govern both commercial and union-sponsored LMIs. 
A. State Regulation of the Employment Agents 
The “turbulent years”172 at the start of the New Deal era created an 
inhospitable political and economic climate for the employment agency 
industry. First, a massive working class upsurge, culminating in the 
formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1935, gave 
voice and power to the unskilled industrial working class. In less than a 
decade, unions tripled their membership, establishing a wide and deep 
beachhead in the manufacturing sector where a third of the non-agricultural 
workforce was employed.173 Second, Fordist mass production techniques 
led many large industrial employers to expand internal job markets, 
providing a large segment of the workforce with long-term job security, 
explicit and implicit contractual offers of competitive wages, opportunities 
for advancement (job ladders), health and pension benefits, and vacation 
schedules.174 This, in turn, provided employers with a cost-effective 
strategy to maintain a long- term, loyal workforce, often trained in firm-
 171. By 1958, the 3900 employment agencies reported to the Census of Business reported 
significant shifts in fee-charging employment practices. Notably, 90 percent of placements were now 
made in white collar occupations and only 10 percent in blue-collar, reversing the proportions 
prevailing at the turn of the twentieth century. Leonard P. Adams, Private Employment Agencies, in 
READINGS ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: COMPILED FOR THE  SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
LABOR, H. COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 742 (1965). Here we exclude 
the continued, widespread presence of private labor contractors in the agricultural sector. 
 172. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 768-95. 
 173. Id. at 769 (documenting that union membership rose from 2,805,000 in 1933 to 8,410,000 in 
1941, encompassing 23 percent of the non-agricultural workforce). 
 174. STONE supra note 1, at 53-55, 57-58. 
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specific skill sets.175 Third, New Deal labor relations policies, workplace 
laws and a growing wartime economic expansion radically expanded 
employment opportunities for armies of unskilled workers,176 large 
numbers of whom had previously entered the job market through 
employment agents. 
The U.S. Department of Labor had begun close monitoring of the 
states’ regulation of private employment agencies and issued two special 
bulletins on the subject in 1933 and 1937.177 With the urging of Secretary 
of Labor Frances Perkins, delegates to the 1935 National Conference on 
Labor Legislation backed passage of federal legislation to regulate 
employment agencies. Following President Roosevelt’s appointment of an 
interdepartmental committee to study the problem, the Department of 
Labor drafted a federal bill to control the activities of employment agents 
carrying on interstate business.178 This bill identified the need to regulate 
the huge interstate component of the employment agency business, whose 
workers were in a “no-man’s land as far as being protected by any of the 
existing private employment agency laws.”179 In 1940, a House Select 
Committee held hearings documenting the “vicious practices” of 
employment agents. Its report painted “a distressing picture of fraud and 
abuse in the recruitment of labor by numerous unscrupulous private 
employment agencies and labor contractors.”180 Out of these efforts came 
the “Employment Agency Act of 1941,” which proposed the U.S. 
Department of Labor register all employment agents operating on an 
interstate basis and contained a number of regulatory provisions modeled 
after the various state laws then in place.181 
 175. Id. 
 176. See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 54-59 
(2002). 
 177. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 581, LAWS RELATING 
TO EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1933 (1933); BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 630, LAWS RELATING TO EMPLOYMENT 
AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF JULY 1, 1937 (1937). 
 178. See PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES, supra note 143, at 16. 
 179. Id. at 17. 
 180. To Regulate Private Employment Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before 
a Subcommittee of the H. Committee on Labor on H.R.5510 A Bill to Regulate Private Employment 
Agencies Engaged in Interstate Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1941). 
 181. H.R. 5510, 77th Cong. (1941), required agents to file fee schedules and allowed the DOL to 
rule on their reasonableness; to keep records of fees received; and to provide employers’ association 
information on any extent to which the agency was controlled by an employer or employers association. 
Its list of prohibitions reflected the state laws, and included providing fraudulent or misleading 
information, sending workers to any place where a strike or lock out existed without providing a written 
statement of such, fee splitting, and charges for anything other than job placement, and the operation of 
agencies in conjunction with other businesses (lodging houses, labor camps, liquor sales). The bill 
provided for fines of up to $5000 and one year imprisonment for each offense, and the appeal of DOL 
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That same year, as the nation geared up for war, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reentered the national debate on the employment agency issue by 
resuscitating the right of states to regulate private fee-charging by 
employment agencies in Olsen v. Nebraska.182 Reversing its 1928 holding 
in Ribnik,183 the Court held that Nebraska’s regulation of the employment 
agency’s most exploitive feature, the fee charged to a worker for job 
placement,184 was a constitutionally permissible exercise of state power. In 
Olson, the Court rejected the argument presented by the employment 
agency: that regulation was no longer warranted because employment 
agency abuses were effectively being curbed by competing social forces in 
the labor market, i.e., “the increasing competition of public employment 
agencies and of charit[ies], labor union[s] and employer association[s].”185 
Whether disingenuous or not, the employment agency’s legal argument in 
Olson conveyed the fact that a host of factors were working in combination 
to deprive the beleaguered employment agency business of its socio-
economic role in the labor market. The military draft and industrial 
mobilization for the war effort ushered in a full-employment economy in 
which the federalized, state-run employment service served as the primary 
job matching service for workers in mainstream labor markets oriented to 
the war-driven economy.186 Moreover, deployment of labor through for-
profit employment agencies produced high-job turnover, low-morale, and 
did not allow for skill training or employee loyalty to the business 
enterprise – practices that were increasingly at odds with employer interests 
and the demands of organized labor. These factors, and the fact that the 
Olsen ruling allowed the states to again strictly regulate employment 
rulings directly to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Aimed primarily at low-wage, unskilled blue-
collar labor, the bill exempted from coverage employment agencies for those working in a professional 
or commercial capacity. 
 182. 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941). 
 183. 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
 184. Among the detailed, stringent provisions of the statute at issue in Olsen, NEB. COMP. STAT. § 
48-508 (1929), were the requirements that the registration fee an agency charged be limited to two 
dollars and in no case exceed ten percent “of all moneys paid to or to be paid or earned by said 
applicant for the first month’s service growing out of said employment furnished by said employer.” 
Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246 n.1 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas offered a terse assessment of the 
employment agency’s effort to cloak its fee charging practices in the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment explaining that 
the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints which respondents have suggested for 
the invalidation of this legislation are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier 
decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be 
read into the Constitution. 
Id. at 246-47. 
 185. Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246. 
 186. See WILLIAM HABER & DANIEL H. KRUGER, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT 
SERVICE IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 31-33 (1964). 
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agencies, were pushing the profit-driven employment agency to the 
economic margins. 
Unfortunately, efforts to pass Secretary Perkins’ federal bill regulating 
the employment agency industry was overtaken by the nation’s focus on 
the war effort and accompanying tumultuous shifts in the U.S. economy 
and labor markets. Despite Congressional hearings where forceful 
testimony favored passage of the Perkins bill and support from the Eighth 
National Conference on Labor Legislation, Congress abandoned Frances 
Perkins’ initiative to federally regulate the employment agency industry – 
the zenith of federal legislative initiatives in this area.187 The bill’s 
introduction just a few short weeks before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor 
meant there would be no vote on the bill. This failure of federal action, 
along with the serious problems internal to the public employment service 
and continued opposition to regulation from private agencies,188 would 
give the temporary help industry an opening for a revival of the private 
employment agency business in a new guise when the war effort ended. 
B. The Rise and Operation of the Union Hiring Hall as a Labor Market 
Intermediary 
The decline of the employment agency industry did not eliminate the 
need for LMIs in the middle decades of the twentieth century. During that 
time, the union hiring hall assumed the role of gatekeeper to certain labor 
markets, exclusively controlling access to certain seasonal labor markets or 
to jobs that were either intermittent or of relatively short duration through a 
contractual arrangement with an employer or group of employers.189 Union 
hiring halls establish employee referral systems by maintaining lists of 
qualified, available workers from which the employer fulfills its hiring 
needs.190 In this regard, the market function of the hiring hall is akin to that 
of profit driven LMIs. However, the union hiring hall is in other respects 
the antithesis and nemesis of for-profit LMIs. Hiring halls in some 
industries arose out of the struggles of common laborers and skilled 
 187. Nevertheless, as late as 1960, concerns over excessive fees charged by private employment 
agencies continued to be expressed by the U.S. Department of Labor and led to the DOL recommending 
that there be maximum fees for agencies placing workers in “both temporary and permanent jobs.” 
BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 209, STATE LAWS REGULATING 
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 11-17 (1960); see Gonos, supra note 48, at 592. 
 188. DESMOND KING, ACTIVELY SEEKING WORK?: THE POLITICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
WELFARE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 65-111 (1995). 
 189. See, e.g., Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers’ Unions in 
Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 52 (2000) (gathering 
sources and defining and explaining the operation of union hiring halls). 
 190. Id. 
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craftsmen who sought to wrest control of access to casual and intermittent 
labor markets away from exploitive employers and profit-driven 
employment agents.191 Over time, union operated hiring halls crafted 
collective bargaining agreements that gave labor organizations a high 
degree of control over access to the relevant labor market. An orderly 
system of job placement based on a seniority system and training 
requirements govern the dispatching of workers to jobs and give workers a 
bargained for level of control over the terms and conditions of 
employment. Despite intermittent or seasonal jobs and changing 
employers, hiring halls provided portable benefits and pensions to users of 
the hall. In sum, the hiring hall model successfully combated the range of 
social ills currently associated with nonstandard and/or contingent work in 
a range of industries and occupations employing highly skilled workers as 
well as unskilled laborers. These points may be illustrated through a brief 
summary of the development and operation of the union hiring halls in the 
maritime, food services, entertainment and construction industries. 
1. The Docks 
Work on the docks of America’s port cities offer a prime example of 
the chaotic and exploitive conditions of casual day labor in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Here workers finally mounted a successful challenge 
the long vilified “shape-up.” As early as 1916, a Washington State Bureau 
of Labor’s report stated that the longshoremen “do not take kindly to the 
‘line-up’ method of selecting crews which is in vogue”192 on the waterfront 
where virtually all hiring was casual and highly seasonal.193 During the 
1930s in New York, then the nation’s largest port, as many as forty-five 
thousand workers sought work under the shape-up system of hiring. Under 
the shape system, the employer enjoyed absolute control over hiring on a 
daily basis.194 Thousands of workers could descend on a busy New York 
pier head on any given day, seeking work assignments from the hiring 
 191. See, e.g., DAVID WELLMAN, THE UNION MAKES US STRONG: RADICAL UNIONISM ON THE SAN 
FRANCISCO WATERFRONT 58-60 (1995). Wellman describes the shape-up: 
Hiring was done at an early morning ‘shape-up,’ or ‘shape’ held in front of piers . . . 
Since anyone desiring work could join the shape, and because unemployment was 
normally very high, the hire was riddled with bribes, kickbacks, favoritism and 
discrimination . . . By the early 1930s it had created a dangerous and brutal speed-up. 
Those who resisted were ether fired or blackballed, and replaced with a casual hired 
form among the unemployed who lingered around the pierheads . . . . 
Id. at 60. 
 192. CHARLES P. LARROWE, SHAPE-UP AND HIRING HALL: A COMPARISON OF HIRING METHODS 
AND LABOR RELATIONS ON THE NEW YORK AND SEATTLE WATERFRONTS 89 (1955). 
 193. Id. at 97 
 194. Id. at 92. 
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bosses who routinely refrained from rehiring the same workers every day to 
make sure that the labor supply each day exceeded the available work of 
unloading and loading vessels.195 Blacklisting, kickbacks to the hiring 
agents, and the inevitable injustices resulting from the daily competition 
among laborers for access to work characterized the degradation workers 
experienced in this labor market.196 
Dockworkers’ demand for an end to the shape-up drove labor 
struggles on West Coast ports for almost twenty years.197 By mid-century, 
labor struggles and legislation established union hiring halls in the port 
cities of New York, Buffalo, and New Orleans,198 bringing a large measure 
of job stability, a living wage, and benefits to dockworkers and other 
maritime workers who had previously been considered the consummate 
casual laborers in industrial America.  
Charles Larrowe described the operation of the Seattle ILWU hiring 
hall in the mid-twentieth century as a “rational solution . . . to the complex 
problems of a casual labor market,” coupled with a “foolproof system 
which has been devised to prevent abuses in the dispatching process.”199 
Dispatching under the hiring hall’s union contract is driven by the goal of 
equalizing earnings among longshoreman.200 To achieve this, a strict 
rotation policy guided the dispatch of eligible workers, and a public 
display, known as the “peg board,” allowed all who used the hiring hall to 
determine that no one had been dispatched out of turn.201 Moreover, new 
 195. MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 96-111. 
 196. Id. 
 197. In 1934, a militant strike by San Francisco’s longshoreman turned the tide. Pitched class 
struggle, portending the coming battles that established industrial unionism throughout basic industry, 
created the hiring hall still administered by the International Longshoreman and Warehousemen’s 
Union (ILWU). It was the culmination of dockworkers longstanding fight to wrest control of hiring 
from the employers and those who administered the hated shape-up on behalf of dock owners and 
shipping companies. ART PREIS, LABOR’S GIANT STEP: TWENTY YEARS OF THE CIO 31-33 (2d ed. 
1972). Indeed, the labor struggles that established the hiring hall in the maritime industry in 1934 are 
recognized as having played a unique role in the development of the American union movement. 
MONTGOMERY, supra note 101, at 96-111. 
 198. See LARROWE, supra note 193, at 180. 
 199. Id. at 139. At the center of the hall is the dispatching office, staffed by union members elected 
to the post for a one-year term. The mechanics of dispatching divides the workforce according to skill, 
experience, and personal qualifications and lists jobs based on skill and difficulty (to accommodate the 
injured and older workers). See id. at 140-42. 
 200. A key feature of this system is job sharing commonly referred to as “low-man out 
dispatching,” which was instituted as part of the agreement that followed the 1934 strike on the West 
Coast. See WILLIAM FINLEY, WORK ON THE WATERFRONT: WORKER POWER AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE IN A WEST COAST PORT 44 (1988). 
 201. Over time, the number of boards multiplied, each offering positions for particular skills and 
machine operations. LARROWE, supra note 193, at 150-51. Exceptions to the strict rotation of the 
dispatch system were only allowed for disability or lack of qualification. Every four-week period, the 
clerk of the hall prepared a report on the earnings of all the gangs of longshoremen and posted a copy in 
the hiring hall. When work was plentiful, the system permitted a great deal of choice for dockworkers 
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registrants were provided with systematic apprentice-like training that 
reinforced hiring hall work rules regulating the pace of work and job 
safety.202 The “goldfish bowl” character of the system, i.e. the creation of a 
high level of transparency to the hiring and deployment process, was seen 
as crucial for the success of the operation since it allowed all workers to 
verify the fairness of the dispatching decisions of the hall.203 
2. Broadway and Hollywood 
The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the Actors’ Equity Association 
(Equity) have utilized hiring halls to effectively represent actors employed 
in the movie industry (SAG) and actors and stage managers in professional 
theater (Equity) since the early decades of the twentieth century.204 Then, 
as is often the case today, an itinerant lifestyle was a prerequisite to steady 
employment in the dramatic arts. SAG and Equity have their origins in 
efforts to control abusive and exploitive practices of theater agents – a 
variant of the old employment agency business – and collusive efforts of 
agents and producers to control access to acting roles and theater jobs. 
Agents are a necessity for professional actors who are often at a 
disadvantage in the labor market due to the surplus of available actors in 
this labor market. Dependence on theater agents’ relationships with 
producers and their knowledge of the industry created the classic exploitive 
three-way hiring scenario: agents charged actors exorbitant fees for access 
to theater jobs and the task of negotiating an actor’s contract of 
employment with the theater.205 Early efforts to regulate exploitive theater 
agent practices was undertaken by union-conscious vaudeville performers 
in New York who lobbied to have theater agents subject to New York’s 
Employment Agency Act which regulated the content of agency contracts 
and set limits on the fees which could be charged by the agents.206 
However, in 1928, after Ribnik v. McBride invalidated New Jersey’s 
employment agency law,207 Equity resorted to self-help, developing its own 
who could check the work assignments and determine when and if to “peg in.” Those who too often 
dodged disagreeable jobs were ostracized for not carrying their weight. See id. at 143-50. 
 202. See id. at 170-71. 
 203. Id. at 144. 
 204. SAG was founded in 1925. Koh Siok Tian Wilson, Talent Agents as Producers: A Historical 
Perspective of Screen Actors Guild Regulations and the Rising Conflict with Managers, 21 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (2001). Actors’ Equity was founded in New York City in 1913. See EQUITY 
AT A GLANCE, <http://www.actorsequity.org/Library/about/about equity_booklet.pdf> (last visited June 
5, 2005). 
 205. Wilson, supra note 205, at 401-02. 
 206. See EQUITY AT A GLANCE, supra note 205. 
 207. 277 U.S. 350 (1928). 
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licensing system for agents. Permits regulated the fees agents could charge 
union members and were required for an agent to do business with 
members of Equity.208 
About the same time, actors in Hollywood founded SAG. Hollywood 
producers lobbied heavily for legislation that would require licensure of 
agents by producers. Actors viewed this as an effort to create one producer-
controlled employment agency to control access to acting jobs and to 
curtail salaries. SAG became an industry force as a direct response to the 
enactment of an industry code that sanctioned the licensure of agents by 
producers and the establishment of an industry cap on actor’s salaries.209 
By 1939, SAG negotiated an industry-wide agreement with agency 
regulations that required licensure of the agents by the union, not 
producers.210 Contract rules forbid agents – who must act at all times as 
fiduciaries on behalf of their client actors – from producing films, a task 
that would surely compromise their fiduciary obligations to the actors they 
represented.211 
Over the years, theatrical agents’ persistent challenges to SAG’s 
regulation of this labor market met with little success. SAG practices were 
defended by the Supreme Court based on the peculiar vulnerabilities of the 
union membership in the entertainment industry labor market.212 In this 
industry, the hiring hall regulates its members’ relationship with individual 
talent agents so that each actor can effectively utilize a chosen agent as an 
intermediary without fear of being exploited or abused. By eschewing the 
role of an individual agent for its members, i.e. the negotiator of an actor’s 
contract with the employer, the union serves as a watchdog over the 
triangulated labor market, setting minimum wages and benefits for all and 
regulating the overarching standards used by individual actors when 
securing the terms and conditions of employment.213 
 208. See EQUITY AT A GLANCE, supra note 205; see also Edelstein v. Gillmore, 35 F.2d 723, 724-
25 (2d Cir. 1929). The right of theater unions to regulate agency fees was upheld when challenged as a 
violation of federal anti-trust laws. See H.A. Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 
704, 706 (1981). 
 209. Wilson, supra note 205, at 405. 
 210. Id. at 405-06. 
 211. Id. at 405. 
 212. See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 720 (finding in the context of an anti-trust challenge to union 
regulation that “[t]he peculiar structure of the legitimate theater industry, where work is intermittent, 
where it is customary if not essential for union members to secure employment through agents, and 
where agents’ fees are calculated as a percentage of a member’s wage, makes it impossible for the 
union to defend even the integrity of the minimum wages without regulation of agency fees”). 
 213. See David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and their Conflicts in the New 
Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 989-92 (2003). 
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3. Waitress Unions in the Food Services Industry 
From the early years of the twentieth century until the 1960s, 
waitresses organized and ran successful unions based on the hiring hall 
model. Labor historian Dorothy Sue Cobble explains that by the end of the 
1940s, union waitresses had a majority of their trade under contract in 
major cities like New York, San Francisco, and Detroit and had organized 
almost one-fourth of waitresses nationwide.214 Although the jobs were 
often of short tenure, the union hiring hall provided members with 
portability of benefits, control over hiring, restrictive membership rules, 
and monitoring of performance. The union also achieved a sense of 
occupational pride in an industry which today is characterized by high 
levels of turnover and is rarely considered a career option. Consider 
Cobble’s description of waitresses’ brand of occupational unionism: 
At the center of occupational unionism lay a reliance on the union-run 
hiring halls and the closed shop. The hiring hall provided the union with 
a regular means of access to the mobile population that comprised the 
hotel and restaurant workforce. Job-seekers went first to the hiring hall, 
where, through the use of a rotation system, they were dispatched 
according to the time they registered. Those desiring work had to meet 
the approval of the union dispatcher and were required to be fully 
qualified union members “in good standing.” Unlike the employment 
agencies against which the union hiring halls competed, the union-run 
agencies prided themselves on offering free service to workers and 
employers.215 
As in the entertainment industry, the waitresses, organized by the 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE), had to face 
the exploitive practices of employment agencies. Union members appealed 
to workers to avoid the “vampire system” of high-fee employment 
agencies.216 Cobble explains that the hiring hall gave waitresses, not 
employers, control over job scheduling, allowing them to determine when 
and how much they worked.217 
4. The Construction Industry 
By the 1950s, the union hiring hall was embedded in the urban-based, 
commercial construction industry, comprised largely of small firms, where 
each building trade union operated its own hall.218 The hiring hall 
 214. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lesson from the History of 
Waitress Unionism, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419, 420 (1991). 
 215. Id. at 423. 
 216. Id. at 424. 
 217. Id. at 424, 427. 
 218. Historically, small firms have dominated the construction industry labor market and hired 
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rationalized this labor market. Building contractors could expect a ready 
supply of quality skilled workers for the length of their responsibilities on 
any given building project.219 It made “economic sense to use temporary 
employees and to rely heavily on the union hiring hall.”220 Indeed, hiring 
halls in this industry “takes workers off contractors’ hands (and payrolls) as 
soon as a project is completed.”221 In the unionized sector of the 
construction industry, most contractors were happy to leave the risks or the 
control over labor supply to unions.222 Unlike the bitter struggles that gave 
rise to the hiring hall on the docks and in the maritime industry, the union 
hiring hall’s position as the prime labor market intermediary in the 
construction industry was acquired as a combined result of three factors: 
first, the high skill level of the trades and resistance to Taylorist approaches 
to work organization; second, a significant level of employer acquiescence, 
i.e., the construction contractors’ desire to be relieved of the costly function 
of labor recruitment; and, third the union’s need to take charge of directing 
worker mobility so as to maintain legitimacy and relevance in the eyes of 
its members.223 In essence, employers in the unionized sector of the 
construction industry abdicated the core labor markets functions – e.g., 
hiring and the distribution of benefits (pensions and healthcare) – to union-
sponsored LMIs. 
 
 
 
skilled craftsmen to work on specific construction projects. Often, the work is seasonal. Relatively low 
levels of capital investment, small firm size, and a relatively backward technological base that was 
largely impervious to Taylorism provided the material foundations for strong craft unions that exercised 
considerable control over the entry to the labor market. Even before the union hiring hall became 
institutionalized throughout the organized sector of the construction industry, the building trades unions 
were able to secure effective union control of access to the job market through enforcement of the 
closed shop, i.e. a combination of requiring the union card or book to work on a job site, the business 
agent system, and a closed shop clause in collective bargaining contracts with contractors’ associations. 
See MARC LINDER, WARS OF ATTRITION: VIETNAM, THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE AND THE DECLINE OF 
CONSTRUCTION UNIONS 116-20 (2000). 
 219. The role of the union hiring hall is unique to the U.S. construction industry. Unlike other 
countries, the building trade unions in the U.S. have long served as a “source of labor supply, as an 
agency to furnish men of an established skill on request of the contractor, and as a means of moving 
labor away from areas of surplus to areas of short supply.” Id. at 116 (quoting John T. Dunlop, Labor 
Management Relations, in DESIGN AND THE PRODUCTION OF HOUSES 259, 262 (1959)). 
 220. Id. (quoting M.R. LEFKOE, THE CRISIS IN CONSTRUCTION: THERE IS AN ANSWER 34 (1970)). 
 221. Id. (citing ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE CHICAGO BUILDING 
TRADES 8 (1927)). 
 222. Id. at 117. 
 223. See id. at 116-18. In the construction industry, the high degree of control the union hiring hall 
exercises over selection and dispatch of union members is in effect a quid pro quo for the building 
contractor’s almost unconditional right to dismiss a union member in a high velocity labor market 
where the union’s desire to minimize frictional unemployment is the paramount concern. 
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C. Labor Unions as Oppressors: Federal Regulation of Union Hiring Halls 
to Prevent Employee Abuse at the Hands of Labor-Sponsored Market 
Intermediaries 
Unregulated LMIs of all kinds have been purveyors of workplace 
abuse. The post-World War II era demonstrates that a union hiring hall’s 
role in the employment relationship, not unlike that of profit-driven LMIs, 
can lead to abuses. Workers in industries where union hiring halls provided 
an entry point into the labor market were particularly susceptible to 
bureaucratic abuses at the hands of undemocratic union officials, mob 
influence,224 and racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. 
Criminal racketeering and mob infiltration was dramatized in the 1954 
Hollywood classic, On the Waterfront, which presented the dark, abusive 
side of union hiring hall practices in the longshoring industry.225 Testimony 
to the McClellan Commission hearings in Congress documented the 
corruption and violence perpetrated against rank and file workers by mob-
influenced unions.226 In the 1960s, civil rights activists pointed to the 
racially discriminatory uses of the union hiring halls’ gatekeeping functions 
as a barrier to fair employment that was responsible for the widespread 
exclusion of African American workers from skilled jobs and apprentice 
positions throughout the skilled trades.227 
The industrial pluralist legal framework put in place by the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Amendments228 and the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Amendments229 to 
the NLRA created a regulatory framework to redress the abuse of workers’ 
rights by labor unions and their officials. These amendments had important 
consequences for the regulation of the hiring hall as an LMI. Although 
driven primarily by the employing class’s post-World War II assault on the 
accumulated economic and social power of the American labor 
movement,230 both sets of amendments to federal labor law were also 
 224. See HERMAN BENSON, REBELS, REFORMERS, AND RACKETEERS: HOW INSURGENTS 
TRANSFORMED THE LABOR MOVEMENT 130-31, 194-97 (2005). 
 225. ON THE WATERFRONT (Horizon Pictures 1954). 
 226. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 217-18 (1994); 
GRACE PALLADINO, SKILLED HANDS, STRONG SPIRITS, A CENTURY OF BUILDING TRADES HISTORY 
148-49 (2005). 
 227. See HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK AND 
THE LAW 235-59 (1977). 
 228. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2006). 
 229. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) and a related series 
of amendments to the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006). 
 230. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY, supra note 227, at 201-08; GEORGE LIPSITZ, CLASS AND CULTURE IN 
COLD WAR AMERICA: “A RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT” 37-111 (1982) (cataloguing the breadth of the post-
war strike wave and widespread rank and file protests opposing the Taft-Hartley amendments). 
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animated by the reality (and even larger mythos) of the “union boss” and 
organized criminal infiltration of certain sectors of the labor movement. 
The impact of Congressional reform of federal labor law on the union 
hiring hall was, therefore, contradictory. On the one hand, it gave rise to a 
regulatory regime that created fairness and transparency in the operation of 
the hiring hall. On the other, it circumscribed the reach of the union hiring 
hall, calling into question its legality in many industries and undermining 
labor’s ability to use the union hiring hall model to organize new members 
in non-standard labor markets. 
Taft-Hartley’s ban of the closed shop was, perhaps, the most 
important legal change affecting the union hiring hall. Banning the closed 
shop threatened to eviscerate the union hiring hall’s role as an LMI, 
through which the union wrested exclusive control of hiring from the 
employer.231 In a host of industries, including longshoring, entertainment, 
and construction, the closed shop and the hiring hall model were 
intertwined, protecting the union’s ability negotiate the terms and 
conditions of employment as well as setting the terms of hiring workers in 
seasonal or intermittent labor markets where NLRA-sanctioned methods of 
long-term organizing and establishing collective bargaining units through 
elections simply do not work.232 It took more than a decade before the 
Landrum Griffin Amendments mitigated the potentially adverse 
consequences of banning closed shop hiring halls in the construction 
industry by adding section 8(f) to the NLRA.233 Under 8(f), an employer 
“engaged primarily” in construction or a union of construction employees 
does not commit an unfair labor practice by negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement at a worksite in advance of the union establishing 
majority status.234 In order to “take into account the occasional nature of 
employment in the building and construction trades,”235 section 8(f) 
authorizes the union to act as gatekeeper and mediator of the employment 
relationship by legalizing pre-hire agreements that require the employer to 
choose its prospective workforce from the union’s hiring hall.236 As 
Senator Taft emphasized, the hiring hall is not “necessarily illegal” and 
employers “should be able to make a contract with the union as an 
 231. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1533 n.253 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); see Lynn 
A. Mourey, Prehire Agreements: Do the Deklewa Rules Effectuate Labor Policy?, CONSTRUCTION 
LAWYER, Jan. 1991, at 21, 21. 
 232. See Mark D. Meredith, From Dancing Halls to Hiring Halls: Actors’ Equity and the Closed 
Shop Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 203-06 (1996). 
 233. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f). 
 234. Id. 
 235. S. Rep. 86-187, at 28 (1959). 
 236. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f). 
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employment agency . . . and in the normal course of events to accept men 
sent to [them] by the hiring hall.”237 Outside of the construction industry, 
however, pre-hire agreements remained unlawful and cannot presently be 
used to organize new bargaining units in other developing contingent labor 
markets under the NLRA’s framework. 
The LMRA also created a new class of union-committed unfair labor 
practices.238 Hence, a union hiring hall cannot force an employer to 
discriminate against applicants or employees so as to encourage or 
discourage union membership,239 nor can it make access to skills programs 
dependent on union membership or on a requirement that referral be from a 
union member.240 Access to referral list information and out-of-work lists 
that serve as the basis for job referrals must be made available to all 
persons using the hiring hall. Unions are legally required to abide by these 
lists that determine the order in which applicants are to be referred and to 
fairly represent all of their members.241 Users of union hiring halls now 
have a multiplicity of overlapping forums in which to bring a claim against 
a union for discriminatory or unfair practices related to the administration 
of the hiring hall. Union hiring halls are subject to unfair labor practice 
charges before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and to suit in 
federal court by any user when a departure from established hiring hall 
procedures results in a denial of employment.242 In conjunction with 
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley amendments,243 the LMRDA allows union 
members to challenge irregularities in the internal governance of a labor 
union.244 Under the LMRDA, union hiring halls cannot charge fees not 
reasonably related to the cost of providing their services.245 Not 
unimportantly, users of the union hiring hall have the right to a jury trial 
 237. Quoted in Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, and Helpers of Am. 
v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961). The legislative history of 8(f) makes it clear that a union hiring 
hall is essential in certain casual or seasonal labor markets and, in those contexts, should not be subject 
to limitation by the closed shop provision of § 8(a)(3) or subject a union to § 8(b) unfair labor practices 
because it discriminates by “encouraging . . . union membership.” S. Rep. 86-187, at 27-29 (1959). 
 238. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). 
 239. See David J. Oliveiri, Unions’ Discriminatory Operation of Exclusive Hiring Hall as Unfair 
Labor Practice Under Section 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 73 A.L.R. FED. 171, § 3 
(1985). 
 240. NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1977); 
IBEW Local 99 (Crawford Electric Construction Co), 214 N.L.R.B. 723 (1974). 
 241. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 232, at 1543-46. 
 242. NLRB v. Local 139, IUOE, 796 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 243. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
 244. Title I of the LMRDA affords union members a “Bill of Rights,” 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15, further 
expanding the duty of fair representation protections of the NLRA first established in Steele v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
 245. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(6). 
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and a wide range of damage remedies against the hiring hall because it is a 
labor organization.246 Comprehensive federal regulation of the hiring hall 
flows from its dual function, i.e. as a union, which gives it the power to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of its members and as an institution that 
“refers workers for employment”247 and thus controls the terms of entry to 
a given labor market. In Breinenger v. Sheet Metal Workers, Justice 
Brennan forcefully explained that the added obligation of referring 
workers, which a hiring hall assumes, increases its power and, 
concomitantly, its fiduciary obligation to those who use the hall.248 Based 
on Breinenger, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “[w]hen a 
union operates a hiring hall and assumes a dual role of employer and 
representative, its obligation to deal fairly extends to all users of the hiring 
hall.”249 
Amendments to the NLRA, coupled with the LMRDA’s requirements 
of union reporting and financial disclosure has made the hiring hall’s 
finances and system of member deployment highly transparent and its 
operations easily subject to open scrutiny by users to ensure fair, neutral 
practices.250 Hence, union halls are subject to penalties for violating the 
rights of a worker that are far greater in scope than those imposed upon any 
other LMI. In sum, developments in federal labor law have made union 
hiring halls the most regulated and transparent LMI, especially when 
compared to the opaque methods of operation of the unregulated modern 
temp agency.251 
D. The Short-Lived Comprehensive Regulations of Labor Market 
Intermediaries at the Height of the Industrial Pluralist Era 
By the1960s, union-sponsored hiring halls and for-profit LMIs were 
both governed by comprehensive regulatory schemes, albeit one federal 
and the other state-based and less uniform. Federal labor law tightly 
 246. See, e.g., NLRB v. Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 575, 773 F.2d 746, 749-50 (6th Cir. 
1985). 
 247. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 88 (1989). 
 248. Id. at 89 (“[I]f a union does wield additional power in a hiring hall by assuming the 
employer’s role, its responsibility to exercise that power fairly increases rather than decreases. That has 
been the logic of our duty of fair representation cases since Steel . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 249. Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 v. NLRB, 50 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(citing inter alia, Breininger, 493 U.S. at 89) (emphasis added); see also Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 
611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that with respect the operation of an exclusive hiring hall, the 
union has a “heightened duty of fair dealing”). 
 250. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 431, 436, 439; see also LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION 
213-18 (William W. Osborne, Jr. et al. eds., 2003). 
 251. See supra Part II. 
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regulated the union hiring hall, curbing the labor bureaucracy’s ability to 
abuse workers deployed by the union-operated halls. At the same time, 
most states regulated private employment agencies to shield workers from 
excessive fee-charging and other common abuses. These state laws 
governed the emerging temporary help industry which had, by this time, 
established a base of significant size by modeling itself on that branch of 
the old employment agency business in which the agent remained tied to 
the worker as a paymaster or “employer” for the life of the job or series of 
jobs.252 The reach of employment agencies was challenged by the state-
administered public employment agencies that offered a no-fee, state-
sponsored entry point into the labor market.253 
Given the functionally equivalent role of the hiring hall and the for-
profit temporary employment agency, it made sense that roughly 
comparable regulatory schemes would govern the two most common forms 
of LMIs, with the hiring hall serving the blue collar, industrial sector and 
the temporary help agency serving the burgeoning non-industrial sectors of 
the U.S. economy. As Steven Willborn explains, both of these LMIs limit 
frictional unemployment, i.e. the time a worker spends searching for work, 
and both have the potential to provide an institutional framework that 
allows workers to acquire medical/welfare coverage and pension benefits 
that otherwise would be unavailable to them as contingent workers.254 
Further, both union hiring halls and commercial temp and staffing agencies 
negotiate and enter into contracts with employers covering the terms and 
conditions of the workers to be deployed to those employers.255 
But significant differences separate the union hiring hall from the 
commercial staffing firm. Workers organized and dispensed by temp 
agencies consistently experience substandard wages, non-existent benefits, 
high levels of alienation, and long-term economic insecurity,256 while 
workers organized and represented by union hiring halls are not subject 
these kinds of exploitation and uncertainty. Rarely, if at all, are workers 
employed through union hiring halls considered “contingent” since they 
have acquired a level of income, job stability, and benefits that are 
characteristic of workers in standard labor markets.257 Moreover, a union 
 252. Gonos, supra note 48, at 593. 
 253. See supra Part III. 
 254. Willborn, supra note 4, at 85-95. Of course, as Willborn also points out, even though both 
union hiring halls and staffing firms are in a position to institute multi-employer benefits plans, such 
plans are routinely provided only by union hiring halls. Id. 
 255. See infra Part VII (expanding on this point when presenting the rationale for a more extensive 
regulation of the mediating role temp agency). 
 256. See supra Part II. 
 257. See Willborn supra note 4, at 90-91. 
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hiring hall’s representation and collective bargaining functions 
constructively redress the unequal bargaining power and employer 
advantage inherent in unorganized labor markets.258 Accordingly, the union 
hiring hall’s mediating role differs fundamentally from that of profit-driven 
LMIs whose mediating role has historically amplified the inequality of 
bargaining power that advantages employers in their dealings with 
unorganized workers.259 This key difference explains why, since the dawn 
of American capitalism, employers have embraced commercial 
intermediaries, gladly ceding to them the role of gatekeeper to certain labor 
markets, but rail against the mediating role of unions as unnecessary 
outsiders or “third-parties” in the employment relationship, and accusing 
them of standing in the way of one-to-one employer/employee negotiations 
and interfering with the operation of free contract in the labor market.260 
A second, and largely unexplored, distinction between union hiring 
halls and profit-driven staffing agencies is the disparate treatment they 
received from government regulators as the industrial pluralist framework 
unraveled. By the early 1970s, radically divergent regulatory regimes 
emerged. On the federal level, tight regulation of the union hiring hall 
continued. On the state-level, an often-ignored radical transformation of 
employment agency laws occurred. As described in the next section, the 
newly launched “temporary” employment agency industry orchestrated a 
state-by-state campaign that placed the temp agency and its prodigy outside 
the comprehensive legal schemes governing traditional employment 
agencies. Consequently, the mediating and representational functions of the 
union hiring hall, for better and worse, remain tightly regulated today, 
while virtually the same functions remain beyond government scrutiny 
when performed by for-profit temporary help or staffing agencies. Not a 
better business model or greater efficiency, but a stark disparity in 
government regulation, then, explains the dominance of the profit-driven 
temp agency in today’s labor markets. The next section outlines how this 
inconsistent and largely inchoate regulatory paradigm came to govern 
similarly situated LMIs in contingent and temporary U.S. labor markets. 
 258. See, e.g., Norris-La Guardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 102 
(2006)). 
 259. See the discussion in Part II concerning the way that commercial staffing agencies deny or 
hide their representative function and negotiate contractual arrangements that deploy workers at lower 
wage levels and strip workers of employment benefits. 
 260. Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), reported in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY59, 59-248 (John R. Commons et al., eds., 1910) (presenting the classic legal 
formulation of the employing class’s visceral disdain for the union as an outside force interfering with 
the master-servant relationship and free market forces); see generally Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 
(Mass. 1900) (outlawing concerted activity which has as its goal the creation of a closed shop). 
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V. UNDER THE RADAR: HOW DEREGULATION PAVED THE WAY FOR THE 
DOMINANCE OF THE FOR-PROFIT TEMPORARY HELP AGENCY IN 
CONTINGENT LABOR MARKETS 
Popular and legislative enmity towards agency fee-charging in the 
Post-World War II period, along with a restructured U.S. labor market, 
spurred a moribund employment agency industry to reinvent itself. What 
resulted was the temporary help staffing industry. The legal focus of this 
nascent industry261 was to place itself beyond the reach of the of state 
employment agency laws, particularly those that limited, or forced the 
disclosure of, agency fees. But directly challenging the legitimacy of state 
regulation of fees was not a battle the temp industry could easily win. The 
courts of Massachusetts and New York, for example, made it clear that 
regulation of employment agency fees was comfortably within the police 
powers of state government.262 Moreover, even if the temp industry could 
make headway on the fee ceiling problem confronting it, state laws would 
still require disclosure of the fee schedule to workers who would make use 
of the agency, making public the mark-up or spread between what a temp 
agency paid a worker and the amount the temp agency billed a 
client/employer for the workers it deployed.263 
What turned out to be the winning legal tack was first presented in the 
mid-1950s by the young temp industry’s leader, Manpower, Inc., and its 
political arm, the National Association of Temporary Services (NATS), 
when it initiated lawsuits challenging the employment agency statutes in 
Florida, Nebraska, and New Jersey. In each suit Manpower claimed that a 
temporary help service firm – the official title the industry was now using – 
was not an employment agency, but rather an employer. Manpower sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief on these grounds to avoid state licensing 
and regulation of its franchisees as employment agencies (and, implicitly, 
to establish them in practice as bona fide employers). The results of the 
litigation were mixed. 
 261. In 1959, the temporary help service industry still represented a small fraction of the private 
employment agency business. In California, for example, out of a total of 2678 licensed employment 
agencies, only 91 were temporary help services. See Adams, supra note 171, at 752-53 (citing 
California Department of Industrial Relations data). 
 262. G&M Employment Serv., Inc., v. Commonwealth, 265 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Mass. 1970); Gail 
Turner Nursing Agency, Inc., v. State, 190 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1959). There were exceptions. The 
high court of Colorado struck down employment agency statutory provisions that were deemed 
excessively restrictive or confiscatory, i.e. set too low a ceiling on fees that could be charged for access 
to a job. People v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960). 
 263. In 1960, twenty-three states set maximum placement fees; eighteen required agencies to 
submit fee schedules to authorities. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 187. 
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In Florida Industrial Commission v. Manpower, Inc. of Miami,264 the 
Florida Supreme Court held that Manpower, a temporary staffing service, 
was not a “private employment agency” within the purview of Florida’s 
employment agency statute. At that time, the Florida statute defined an 
employment agency as “any person, firm or corporation, who for hire or for 
profit, shall undertake to secure employment or help [for another] or offers 
to secure employment or help.”265 The statute defined the fee charged by an 
employment agency as “the difference between the amount of money 
received by any person, who furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid 
by said person receiving said amount of money to the employees . . . whom 
he hires.”266 Simply put, the statute considered the employment agency’s 
fee as a mark-up, i.e. the difference between what the temp agency pays the 
worker and the amount it receives from the business to which it provides 
the temp worker, and regulated it as such.  
The Court studiously avoided challenging the state’s right to regulate 
agency fees or even analyzing whether a temp agency charges a fee to 
workers. Instead, the Florida high court strained basic rules of grammar to 
redefine Manpower’s function as falling outside the statute. Manpower, 
stated the court, provides “various types of services for its customers, 
including among others, typists, stenographers, comptometer operators, 
general office workers, bookkeepers, factory workers . . . .” 267 Proper 
grammar would, of course, have required the Court to state that Manpower 
“provides typing services, stenographic services, etc”. The Court’s 
maladroit grammar is not accidental. Labeling typists and factory workers 
as “services” is essential to the Court’s reasoning since it found that a 
temporary help agency is not an employment agency because it provides a 
“service” to its clients, i.e. – it does not provide business clients with 
human labor. 
Manpower hires its own employees and sends them to the customer to 
perform the service required . . .  The customer enters into a contract with 
Manpower for the particular service to be performed and pays the contract 
price to Manpower. Manpower pays the employee at a salary agreed upon 
between Manpower and the employee.268 
The Court ignored the user firm’s control and direction of the temps 
deployed to its place of business and declared that Manpower’s employer 
 264. 91 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1956). 
 265. Id. at 198. 
 266. Id. at 198-99. 
 267. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. 
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status flows from that fact that it “retains control over its employees, and 
can substitute one employee for another in any particular job.”269 
The Court conceded that the statute’s plain language subjected 
Manpower to regulation as an employment agency since it “secures or 
provides help” for its customers.270 But, the plain language, says the Court, 
would also result in a host of different business who are not temp agencies 
being improperly subject to employment agency law. For example, “a court 
reporter who sends his employee to a law office to take a deposition or a 
detective agency which sends its employee to guard documents [and] 
accountants whose employees do bookkeeping service for customers”271 
would fall within the statute’s reach. The court concluded that the fact that 
Manpower “secured help” for its customers was not controlling, and “by 
the same token,” the definition of fee was also not applicable to the profit 
inuring to Manpower.272 The problem with the Court’s reasoning, of 
course, is that unlike the other businesses named, Manpower neither 
provides or guarantees the provision to its customers of any particular 
product or service; rather, it provides only the labor, i.e. “help,” for any 
kind of work the customer requires. In this regard, the Court’s analysis fails 
to recognize the fundamental difference between subcontracting for a 
product or service and what is called labor-only contracting.273 
The court in Florida Industrial Commission rejected the usual judicial 
obligation to defer to the state Labor Commission’s interpretation of the 
statute because, as a matter of policy, it did not view Manpower as 
exhibiting “the evils incident to private employment agencies which 
statutes such as ours were enacted to correct.”274 Citing the string of abuses 
which Justice Brandeis enumerated in his dissent in Adams v. Tanner, the 
Court concluded that, “clearly, the method of operation of Manpower is 
susceptible to none of the abuses mentioned” in Adams v. Tanner.275 
Therefore, the Court found that Manpower did not function as an 
employment agency, but rather was “a legitimate business, performing a 
new type of service to individuals and firms.”276 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 199. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. E. Epstein & J. Monat, Labor Contracting and Its Regulation: I, 107 INT’L LAB. REV. 451, 451 
(1973) (defining labor-only contracting as an “oral or written contract between an employer and an 
intermediary having as a major if not exclusive object the supply of labour” as opposed to a product or a 
service). 
 274. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 91 So. 2d at 200. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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Courts in Nebraska277 and New Jersey,278 however, rejected the 
position advanced by Manpower and the Florida Court’s reasoning. The 
New Jersey ruling, Manpower, Inc. of New Jersey v. Richman, provides the 
well-developed argument for subjecting temp agencies to state regulation. 
This case pitted the soon-to-become temp industry giant against the New 
Jersey Commissioner of Labor. Manpower sought exemption from that 
state’s employment agency licensing and fee regulation requirements on 
the grounds that it was an employer not an agency.279 The ruling is in all 
respects at odds with Florida Industrial Commission. The judge held that 
Manpower was an employment agency and described the labor market 
function of the upstart temp industry as that of an intermediary that 
procures labor for employers – temporary clerical workers to business and 
unskilled workers to industry.280 This challenged Manpower’s argument 
that it was primarily a direct employer of others. The court explained that a 
temporary help agency can only be said to be in an employer-employee 
relationship with temp workers “in the broad use of the phrase” because, as 
the court noted, Manpower “ha[d] no supervision or control over the work 
once he or she report[ed] on the job . . . . [I]t [was] the customer who 
direct[ed] and control[led] the workers, assign[ed] the work . . . , direct[ed] 
the manner of doing it, fixe[d] the hours of work, recess and the like.”281 
Once the workers were deployed to an assigned workplace by Manpower, 
“a master and servant relationship [was] created between the worker and 
the customer.”282 Indeed, Manpower “[knew] nothing of what the worker 
 277. Nebraska ex rel. Weasmer v. Manpower of Omaha, Inc., 73 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Neb. 1955). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court tersely rejected Manpower’s argument that its activity as described in the 
complaint fell outside the statute regulating employment agencies. Unfortunately, the high court 
dismissed the case on a technicality, the State’s failure to prove service of a bill of exceptions on 
defendant. Id. at 700. 
 278. Manpower, Inc. of N.J. v. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. (Super. Ct. N.J. June 24, 1957).  
 279. Id. at 2, 3-5.  Notably, the definition of employment agency in the New Jersey law was 
substantively the same as the Florida statute: an employment agency was “the business of procuring or 
offering to procure help or employment, or the giving of information as to where help or employment 
may be procured.” 1951 N.J. Laws 1195 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8-24(1) (1952)). The fee is 
also similarly defined, as “the difference between the amount of money received by any person who . . . 
furnishes employees . . . and the amount paid by such person or person to the employees.” 1951 N.J. 
Laws 1196 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8-24(1) (1952)) Indeed, the definition of the fee would be 
“meaningless unless the act itself is taken to include ...[Manpower’s]type of operation.” Richman, No. 
L-22576-56, slip op. at 8. 
 280. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. at 6-8. Typists and stenographers – mostly “women, 
usually married, who look for part-time work to supplement the family income” – were deployed to 
office jobs after skills and/or employment history was verified and skills were matched with the 
requirements of the assignment. Unskilled industrial workers gathered in the agency’s large rooms on 
benches or chairs, and the office manager sat at a phone. As request came in, he filled them from among 
the men in the room. See id. at 3-4. 
 281. Id. at 5. 
 282. Id. 
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[was] doing” on the job.283 
The court also rejected Manpower’s argument that the temp agency’s 
task, “procuring and furnishing” labor to another, was the functional 
equivalent of “doing the work” of the employer.284 Indeed, the judge noted 
that the most common, widely-cited definition of employment agency 
included agencies that engage in “the employment of laborers to work for 
another.”285 The New Jersey judge concluded that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s ruling was a “very narrow interpretation of the Employment 
Agency Act” that looked to form rather than to the substance.286 There was 
no doubt, said the judge, 
but that Manpower is striving to avoid the regulations of the State 
Employment Agency Acts and has meticulously set up its method of 
operations, the forms it uses, and so forth, to try to avoid the label 
“employment agency.” In substance, though, plaintiff is in the business 
of procuring and furnishing help or employment for a fee and therefore is 
subject to the New Jersey act.287 
At the same time, the court recognized that the temp agency should 
remain legally accountable for its strictly ministerial role of withholding 
income taxes and social security, paying unemploy- ment contributions, 
and carrying workmen’s compensation insurance.288 In this regard, the 
court explained that Manpower was also properly classified as an employer 
under New Jersey employment statutes.289 
What is important is that while there may be an employer-employee 
relationship as between [Manpower] and the worker, sufficient to bring 
plaintiff under the unemployment act and even the Workmen’s 
Compensation law, there is also a master and servant relationship 
between the customer and the worker and the plaintiff is in the business 
of creating this relationship for a fee and is therefore an employment 
agency under our act.290 
As a matter of public policy, the court noted that an unregulated temp 
agency is as susceptible of abusing and exploiting workers as are other 
types of employment agents. This is because the temp agency, like all 
 283. Id. at 6. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 9 (quoting the Tennessee employment agency statute as cited in MacMillan v. City of 
Knoxville, 202 S.W. 65, 66 (Tenn. 1918)). Notably, Florida Industrial Commission also cites 
MacMillan, see 91 So. 2d at 198, but ignores this specific language, “employment of laborers to work 
for another,” severely undermining the reasoning used by the Florida Supreme Court to reach its 
conclusion that Manpower was an employer and not an employment agent. 
 286. Richman, No. L-22576-56, slip op. at 10. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 11-12. 
 290. Id. at 12. 
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employment agencies, charges a fee in exchange for access to employment. 
For this reason, it is important for a man looking for “a day’s work . . . to 
know what Manpower is charging the customer for his work, or, to put it 
another way, it is important for the worker to know how the money paid by 
the customer will be divided as between plaintiff and himself.”291 The New 
Jersey court’s staunch defense of state regulation of temp agencies presents 
two important lessons. First, the court articulated the need for institutional 
transparency and accountability for the fee a temporary agency charges a 
worker, no matter how it is disguised. This restates the core purpose of all 
statutes that regulate employment agencies. Second, the court’s reasoning 
sought to capture the complex duality of the temporary employment 
agency’s market function by recognizing that a temp agency can have a 
dual status – as an employment agency and as an employer. In other words, 
a temp agency is properly subject to employment agency law and 
workplace laws governing employers. The court’s characterization of the 
legal status of the temp agency thus parallels the dual status that federal 
courts have assigned the union hiring hall under federal labor law.292 
Unfortunately, other state courts never had the opportunity to follow the 
reasoning presented in New Jersey’s Manpower v. Richman ruling. Given 
the mixed results of the Florida, Nebraska, and New Jersey rulings, the 
young temp industry’s litigation strategy to exempt itself from the states’ 
employment agency laws proved to be problematic and seems to have been 
suspended. Following these rulings, NATS turned to lobbying and 
legislative reform. 
The temporary help industry rapidly escaped regulation once it figured 
out that its status as an agency could be avoided by enacting simple 
amendments to state employment agency laws. Consider Maryland’s Fee 
Charging Employment Agency Law, a fair representative of the statutory 
amendments the temp industry successfully enacted. The Maryland statute 
was amended to read that an employment agency “shall not include any 
person conducting a business which consists of employing individuals 
directly for the purpose of furnishing part-time or temporary help to 
others.”293 Language of this sort was first put in place in the two largest 
temp-agency markets, New York in 1958 and California in 1960.294 By 
 291. Id. at 13. 
 292. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1989); 
supra Part IV.C . 
 293. MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 9-101(d)(1) (West 2008). 
 294. See George Gonos, The Contest of Employer Status in the Postwar United States: The Case of 
Temporary Help Firms, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 81, 94-95 (1997); see also Chris Forde, You Know We 
are Not an Employment Agency: Manpower, Government, and the Development of the Temporary Help 
Industry in Britain, 9 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 337, 357-58, 360 (2008) (noting the legislative 
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1971, all but two states had either amended their statutes to exclude temp 
agencies from the definition of employment agency or achieved the same 
result by administrative interpretation of employment agency statutes.295 
Testimony and documents presented at federal congressional hearings 
on day labor legislation in 1971 attributed the rapid exemption of temp 
agencies from state regulation to “the very active campaign for exclusion, 
with Manpower, Inc., carrying the ball.”296 Unfortunately, over the 
relatively short course of the NATS-coordinated, state-by-state lobbying 
campaign to escape regulation,297 no labor organization or other watchdog 
agency stepped up to challenge temp industry by exposing the exploitive 
hidden fees and other problems faced by temp agency workers. In short, 
there was no pressure from anywhere to back up the critical assaults on the 
industry of the kind being made by U.S. Senator Walter Mondale, who in 
1971 attacked the “unconscionable fees” charged to temp workers.298 
Consequently, federal legislative initiatives aiming to redress the problems 
of the now-deregulated industry faced strong opposition from a temp 
agency lobby flush with success at the state level and never made it out of 
committee.299 By 1982, a decade after consolidating a regulation-free legal 
environment for the temp industry, NATS’ official publication, 
Contemporary Times, could justifiably claim that “[o]ne of the most 
important reasons for NATS’ existence is to keep the industry free of 
regulation . . . . NATS constantly monitors all [government] actions – 
national, state and local.”300 
A dramatic expansion in the use of temp agency labor followed the 
industry’s unchallenged and successful deregulation effort. By the end of 
the twentieth century, the temp agency industry’s public relations 
pronouncements safely claimed that temporary help firms were not 
employment agencies and did not charge fees.301 These claims were 
possible, of course, only because the states failed to exercise their police 
powers to regulate the exorbitant “hidden fees” that make billions for the 
developments in the states, and the similar concept in Britain). 
 295. Gonos, supra note 295, at 95. 
 296. A Bill to Establish and Protect the Rights of Day Laborers: Hearing on H.R. 10349 Before the 
Special Subcommittee on Labor of the H. Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 199 (1971) 
(statement of Abner Mikva, Illinois Representative). 
 297. See Gonos, supra note 294, at 94-97. 
 298. 117 CONG. REC. S36653 (Oct 19, 1971). 
 299. Gonos, supra note 138, at 23-24. 
 300. Legislative Monitoring – An Association Necessity, CONTEMPORARY TIMES, Winter 1982, at 
15. 
 301. Recruitment advertisements boast that temporary staffing firms charge “no fees” that they are 
“Not an agency – Never a fee” and that there is “Never a fee to the job seeker.” The claim is “All Fees 
Company Paid.” See Gonos, supra note 48, at 590. 
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temp industry but afford sub-standard wages for those deployed by it. 
Though wage and hour violations by temp agencies are indeed a real 
problem, particularly at the industry’s low end,302 the substandard wage 
structure of the temp industry cannot be challenged under existing wage 
and hour laws.303  The larger issue – the “hidden fee” captured by temp 
agencies through their contractural arrangements with client firms – 
remains totally invisible under wage and hour law. It is this mandatory, but 
“hidden fee,” of course, that results in a rate of compensation for temp 
workers far below what permanent workers earn for performing 
comparable tasks. Unfortunately, discussion of the consequences of work 
law’s failure to legally identify and regulate the “hidden fee” extracted 
from agency-deployed temps has also disappeared from the legal discourse. 
Yet, for-profit LMIs are now a permanent, ubiquitous feature of labor 
markets throughout the economy. It is time to revive the issue of regulating 
the fees charged to workers who are deployed by the temp agency industry. 
VI. CONTESTING THE LEGAL STATUS OF FOR-PROFIT LABOR MARKET 
INTERMEDIARIES IN TWENTY FIRST CENTURY LABOR MARKETS 
The neo-liberal globalization polices that foisted flexible and lean 
production methods upon late twentieth century labor markets gave rise to 
a new round of workplace struggles and legal contests relevant to a 
reexamination of the legal status of profit driven LMIs. We examine four 
such contests that challenged the prevailing legal status of the for-profit 
LMIs. We first look at the case of “perma-temps” at Microsoft Corporation 
whose legal action resulted in their inclusion in the company’s lucrative 
stock option plans. We next discuss the legal obstacles that labor unions 
have faced in trying to win collective bargaining rights for temp agency 
workers under federal labor law. Third, we explore how states are creating 
government-sponsored, public LMIs to provide substantial improvements 
in nonstandard labor markets employing home health care aides. We 
conclude with a review of immigrant day laborers’ fight to eliminate the 
 302. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 25-26; see also National Employment Law Project, 
A Comparison of Day Labor Statutes as of 2005 <http://nelp.3cdn.net/715918a807040 
aa8fc_29m6bhv42.pdf.> (last visited on Aug. 8, 2009) (compiling statutes addressing abuses). 
 303. Under FLSA, an agency charging workers recruitment fees to gain access to employment are 
actionable as an unlawful deduction from wages only if those fees are determined to be “primarily for 
the benefit of the employer,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2006), 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2009), and if the payment 
of recruitment fees brings the wage paid below the statutory minimum. See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, 
LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002); Rivera v. The Brickman Group Ltd., Civ. No. 05-1518, 
2008 WL 81570, *12-14 (Jan. 7, 2008 E.D. Pa); see generally Andrea L. Schmitt, Ending the Silence: 
Thai H-2A Workers, Recruitment Fees and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
167 (2007) (applying FLSA standards to recruitment fees charged to Thai H-2A workers). 
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exploitive features of the street corner shape-ups that have reappeared in 
neighborhoods and parking lots and the industrial-sector temp agencies that 
have blossomed in immigrant communities across America. Considered in 
the aggregate, these developments suggest workable legal constructs that 
contribute to reconceptualizing the tenuous and flawed employer status of 
the for-profit LMI. 
A. Microsoft’s Perma-temps: Judicial Erosion of the Temp Agency’s 
Employer Status 
In the 1990s, the legal battle of non-standard workers at Microsoft 
Corporation portended a potentially important shift in the way courts 
examined the status of temp workers and their relationship to the 
businesses where they perform work. In Vizcaino v. Microsoft,304 the 
plaintiffs were long-term “contractors” who worked on software products 
integral to the company’s core business. They performed their job at 
Microsoft’s offices under the direct supervision of Microsoft managers. 
However, because these workers were payrolled through outside staffing 
agencies, Microsoft classified them as “temporary” non-employees, 
denying them company benefits and other rights and privileges enjoyed by 
similarly situated traditional employees.305 After years of litigation, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that the agency temps were 
employees of Microsoft – not the staffing firms – and, therefore, entitled to 
participate in the company’s highly lucrative stock purchase plan.306 
Vizcaino and the ongoing organizing of high-tech temp workers in 
Washington State and other states307 cast a bright light on a dark side of the 
temporary staffing industry’s normative practices: Employment through a 
temp agency, as a matter of course, deprives workers of the wages, 
benefits, and terms and conditions of employment which accrue to 
similarly situated permanent employees. By ruling that Microsoft was the 
legal employer of these long-term temp workers with respect to a lucrative 
benefit, the Ninth Circuit called into question the temporary staffing 
agency’s status as the “real employer” of temp workers. As such, Vizcaino 
put forth the potentially explosive proposition that user firms may have the 
 304. 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) (Vizcaino I), modified en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Vizcaino II), enf’d by mandamus, Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 305. Vizcaino I, 97 F.3d at 1190. 
 306. Vizcaino II, 120 F.3d at 1012. 
 307. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at 373-76; see also About WashTech, WASHTECH: A VOICE 
FOR THE DIGITAL WORKFORCE <http://www.washtech.org/about/> (providing information on the 
efforts and strategies used by Washtech and the Communications Workers of America to organize high-
tech temp workers) (last visited Aug. 8, 2009). 
FREEMAN AND GONOS  11/20/2009  11:11:02 AM 
156 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 13:nn 
 
legal obligation of employers with respect to the core terms and conditions 
of employment of temp agency workers, thereby placing in doubt the 
economic efficacy of the widespread use of outside agencies to create a 
two-tier workforce with drastically differing sets of rights and rewards. 308 
B. Who is the Boss? – Bargaining Rights for Temp Under the NLRA 
Three years after the Ninth Circuit’s Vizcaino ruling, the National 
Labor Relations Board addressed bargaining unit issues that arose from the 
rapid expansion of the contingent workforce and the challenges facing 
labor unions at worksites where non-union temp workers are employed 
alongside members of a collective bargaining unit of permanent workers. 
M.B. Sturgis,309 posed 
the question of whether and under what circumstances employees who 
are jointly employed by a “user” employer and a “supplier” employer 
[the temp agency] can be included for representational purposes in a 
bargaining unit with employees who are solely employed by the user 
employer.310 
The triangulated employment relationship present in M.B. Sturgis 
typifies the temp agency staffing model: temps from the staffing agency 
(the supplier-firm) were deployed to the user employer’s worksite (the user 
firm); temps performed the same work as the full-time unionized 
employees, were governed by common work and safety rules, and were 
subject to the same user-firm supervision as the permanent employees. The 
Board found “no evidence of any assignment or direction by the onsite 
[temp agency] representative.”311 Differences in employment conditions 
were limited to wage rates, availability of overtime and, presumably, the 
rules for hiring and promotions. This landmark decision held that 
temporary employees are entitled to bargaining unit status at the user 
employer’s place of business without the mutual consent of the user and 
supplier firms.312 The Board held that staffing agencies are not 
 308. This fundamental principle enuncited by Vizcaino was widely recognized as a shift in the 
treatment of temp workers even though the practical impact of the decision was limited due to the fact 
that the court’s ruling was based on specific pension plan language that other major user firms learned 
to avoid by revising the language of their pension and benefit plans, and also because other circuits did 
not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead. But, for a time, Vizcaino seemed to shake the world of corporate 
human resources with the possibility that outsourcing of employer responsibilities to staffing agencies – 
a central mechanism of the “flexible workforce” – might become financially untenable due to the 
obligations that the Ninth Circuit imposed on user firms that employed permatemps. 
 309. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), rev’d in part, Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 76 (2004). 
 310. Id. at 1298. 
 311. Id. at 1301. 
 312. Prior to M.B. Sturgis, Board decisions had established a bargaining unit rule which, in effect, 
precluded temporary workers from joining or accreting into a bargaining unit comprised of the user 
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“independent employers,” pointing out that “all of the work is being 
performed for the user employer” and that “all the employees in fact share 
the same employer, i.e., the user employer.”313 In these circumstances, i.e., 
when the locus of control rests entirely with the user employer, the Board 
recognized that the supplier’s consent to include the temp workers in the 
unit is irrelevant. Instead, the traditional community of interest test should 
determine the composition of the appropriate bargaining unit.314 The Board 
concluded that temp workers may have two employers in these situations 
and share a community of interest with permanent employees covered 
under the union’s collective bargaining agreement.315 
Shortly thereafter, in Tree of Life, an administrative law judge applied 
the M.B. Sturgis joint-employer doctrine to hold that a unionized user firm 
was obligated to include agency temps in its bargaining unit and had a duty 
to bargain with the union over those aspects of the temps’ working 
conditions that it controlled, including the wage rates established by the 
bargaining agreement between the union and the user firm.316 On review, 
the Board backed away from a remarkably significant part of the ALJ’s 
ruling: that union wage rates be applied to the temps.317 The Board’s 
hesitancy to follow its own reasoning on this aspect of the decision blunted 
what would have been a remarkable condemnation of the core exploitive 
practice: structuring wage rates in temporary labor markets. Notably, 
however, in her concurring opinion, Board Member Liebman stated that 
she would have upheld the ALJ’s ruling and applied all the terms and 
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement – including those 
affecting wages – to the temporary workers, “just as if the [user employer] 
had hired them without using an intermediary.”318 Liebman’s approach 
recognized the socioeconomic reality of the triangular employment 
relationship, i.e., that the user firm is the primary employer substantially 
controlling the terms and conditions of work, and the temp firm functions 
only as a market intermediary, supplying labor, 319 entirely dependent for 
its margin on the terms agreed upon with the user firm. Although the 
majority decision in Tree of Life suggested an unwillingness to provide a 
employer’s workers without the consent of both the temporary agency and the user firm. Greenhoot, 
Inc., Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947, 948 (1990); 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973); see M.B. Sturgis, 331 
N.L.R.B. at 1302-06. 
 313. M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305. 
 314. Id. at 1305-06. 
 315. Id. at 1306. 
 316. Tree of Life, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 872 (2001) 
 317. Id. at 872. 
 318. Id. at 876 (Liebman, M., concurring). 
 319. See id. at 875-76. 
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remedy for the core pay and benefits disparities experienced by temp 
workers, the decision did signal the Board’s willingness to adapt labor law 
to changing labor markets where temporary staffing firms control virtually 
none of the terms and conditions of the workers they supply to cl
However, the joint employer doctrine enunciated in M.B. Sturgis 
succumbed to the regressive policies pushed by President George W. 
Bush’s Board appointees. In 2004, the NLRB issued Oakwood Care 
Center,320 overturning M.B. Sturgis and, implicitly, Tree of Life. In 
Oakwood Care Center, the NLRB held that the temp agency and the user 
firm constitute a multi-employer bargaining unit, and, hence, both must 
consent before the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining 
agreement can cover the employees of the temp agency.321 This position, of 
course, rejects applying the joint-employer doctrine to the temp agency 
employment paradigm for purposes of union organizing and collective 
bargaining. The Board replaced a doctrine that recognized the 
socioeconomic realities of the temporary work relationship – under which 
the determination of employer status would be based on an examination of 
who actually supervises and directs the work of the temp worker – with an 
abstract principle of employer choice.322 Notably, the majority opinion in 
Oakwood Care reserved a good deal of its indignation for the Tree of Life 
ruling and the application of, what the majority called “the strained logic of 
Sturgis,” by which the Board ordered the accretion of temp workers into 
the user employer’s bargaining unit and mandated that the temps be subject 
to terms of the user employer’s contract with the union.323 
Despite their improvident reversals, the reasoning used in M.B. Sturgis 
and Tree of Life, and in Vizcaino, underscores the tenuous employer status 
of the profit-driven temp agency. These cases also highlight Professor 
Michael Harper’s argument that determining who is an employer for 
purposes of collective bargaining should rest on whether a given entity is a 
“primary direct capital provider,” i.e., whether a business supplies a 
 320. 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004). 
 321. Id. at 659. 
 322. Indeed, “free choice” has replaced what the NLRB long considered the most important factor 
in deciding employer status: the degree of control exercised over the work of employees. See Deaton 
Truck Line, 143 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1963). Grounding its reasoning in common law precepts, the NLRB 
has stated that an employer-employee relationship exists “where the person for whom the services are 
performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the means to be used in 
reaching such end.” Id. at 1372. In this regard, the temp agency’s control over workers it deploys is 
usually non-existent. See also Wilma Liebman, Labor Law Inside Out, 11 WORKING USA: J. LAB. & 
SOC’Y 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that “free choice” to avoid unionization has become the bedrock operative 
principle of the Bush-appointed NLRB majority). 
 323. Oakwood Care, 343 N.L.R.B. at 661. 
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substantial proportion of the capital made productive by the employees.324 
The issue of who supervises the temporary employee would not prove 
dispositive. In other words, staffing firms would be excluded from the 
category of employers, even in circumstances where a staffing agency takes 
on a certain degree of supervisory authority over temp workers at a user 
firm’s place of business. Harper’s analysis rests on a fundamental structural 
characteristic of temp and staffing agencies: these entities perform few, if 
any, of the traditional economic functions associated with bona fide 
employers that utilize labor to make their capital productive. Professor 
Harper’s approach to determining employer status calls attention to the fact 
that a temp agency’s legal status as an employer rests largely on the most 
ministerial of employer duties325 – issuance of a paycheck, preparing W-2 
forms, withholding taxes, and carrying worker’s compensation insurance. 
C. Creating Employers of Record: State-Supported Labor Market 
Intermediaries and the Lessons of Organizing Home Health Care Aides 
Workers and progressive reformers such as John Commons and his 
followers who led the early twentieth-century legislative reform efforts 
addressing the social ills of contingent labor markets advocated the 
formation of state-run, public employment agencies to replace the 
exploitive, profit-driven employment agency.326 These reformers 
recognized that some type of LMI – preferably one that was not profit-
driven – is often necessary to create efficient and well-functioning labor 
markets.327 Almost a century later, under the guidance of organized labor, 
tens of thousands of home health care aides (HCAs)328 in California, 
Oregon, Washington, Illinois, and Massachusetts have benefited from the 
establishment of government-run LMIs, often referred to as home care 
workforce councils or public authorities.329 Prior to the legislative 
 324. Michael Harper, The Provision of Capital and Collective Bargaining Responsibilities, in 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVE/SUPPLEMENTS TO 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 77, 77-116. (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998). 
 325. While the question of withholding taxes and social security payments from workers is a 
relevant factor, it has not been considered determinative. See, e.g., Frederick O. Glass, 135 N.L.R.B. 
217, enforced in part, 317 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1963); see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 
232, at 1595. 
 326. See Henry D. Sayer, State Control of Job Agencies, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 369, 369-371 
(1930) (author was former Industrial Commissioner, State of New York). 
 327. See COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 126. 
 328. These workers provide essential long and short-term health-care assistance to disabled 
individuals and the elderly in their homes, allowing them to avoid extended stays in costlier nursing 
homes or assisted living centers. 
 329. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR QUALITY PERSONAL 
CARE: HOW SEIU HAS WORKED IN COALITION WITH CONSUMERS AND ADVOCATES TO WIN 
FREEMAN AND GONOS  11/20/2009  11:11:02 AM 
160 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 13:nn 
 
enactment of these public authorities or workforce councils, HCAs were 
classified as independent contractors, directly hired and supervised by 
individuals with disabilities or age-related infirmities, but receiving a 
government paycheck from state and federal welfare fund coffers. Under 
this arrangement, a profound practical problem faced HCAs who attempted 
to improve wages or benefits: the designated employer – the sick, disabled 
or elderly individual they served – had no legal authority to change the pay 
rates or provide benefits. These workers experienced all the classic 
problems associated with temporary work for multiple, serial employers: 
intermittent employment, transiency, less-than-full-time schedules, and low 
wages. HCAs received no work-related benefits and stood outside federal 
or state laws granting employees the right to organize and collectively 
bargain.330 As one California worker summed it up, “[w]e were an invisible 
workforce, nobody even knew we existed.”331 
For HCAs and certain other non-standard workers, then, it is the 
absence of an LMI in contingent and temporary labor markets that gives 
rise to exploitation of workers and often adversely impacts employers who 
have no effective means for rationalizing hiring and job placement. 
Without LMIs, the contingent workforce remains atomized in ways that 
prevent the implementation of industry standards or employment benefits. 
Moreover, employers in the U.S. labor market who directly employ 
temporary and contingent workers commonly misclassify temps as 
independent contractors, even when they lack the skills and bargaining 
power associated with bona fide independent contractors, such as highly 
skilled technicians or skilled tradespeople.332 Due to the expansive 
definition universally used to determine independent contractor status, 
persons who are, in reality, “dependent contractors” are deprived of the 
right to unionize, and the protection of a myriad of state and federal statutes 
that protect employees, but exclude independent contractors.333 
California was the first state to pass legislation enabling the 
transformation and rationalization of this contingent labor market.334 The 
WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT FOR CONSUMER-DIRECTED PERSONAL CARE THROUGH WORKFORCE 
COUNCILS (2005), <http://s67.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7BA168C1B2-E6E9-4583-8BD1-
9F21D62CA0C4%7D/uploads/%7B94C40E53-4FD4-47D2-AABF-71A33E87A66F%7D.PDF> (last 
visited on Aug. 9, 2009). 
 330. See Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An Analysis of a 
Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 3-5 (2002). 
 331. Id. at 4. 
 332. See generally Elizabeth Kennedy, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights 
for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005) (discussing vulnerability of 
low-wage, unskilled workers who fall under worklaw definitions of independent contractor). 
 333. Id. 
 334. See SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, supra note 330, at 3. 
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effort began when the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
initiated a campaign to organize 74,000 HCAs in Los Angeles in 1987.335 
Organizing these workers proved daunting. Shifting worksites were the 
norm, and turnover rates among HCAs were 40 percent.336 Constant 
reorganization was necessary just to maintain a minimum level of 
membership. The organizing campaign ultimately turned the corner 
through a protracted grassroots legislative campaign of the members that 
first resulted in a statutory increase in the hourly raise.337 In 1992, an 
SEIU-led coalition persuaded the state legislature to enact legislation that 
enabled county governments to establish a public authority as the employer 
of record for the HCAs.338 The public authorities were granted the 
following functions and responsibilities: creating a registry of HCAs to 
assist recipients of in-home support services in finding appropriate 
employees; establishing a system of referral for HCAs seeking 
employment; investigating the qualifications and background of HCAs; and 
training providers and recipients.339 The legislation also expressly gave 
recipients the power to hire, fire, and supervise the work of any in-home 
supportive service workers.340 Finally, the authority was mandated to 
bargain with the HCA’s union and establish a dues check-off should the 
s unionize.341 
In 1997, Los Angeles passed an ordinance enabling a public authority 
to employ HCAs.342 Two years later SEIU won a union election and 
established a five-year collective bargaining agreement that provided 
improved wages and medical benefits to its members. By that time, 
Alameda County and San Francisco had also established public authorities 
and the HCAs won labor contracts that included medical benefits, and in 
San Francisco, medical and dental benefits. More than 100,000 HCAs, 
overwhelmingly female and largely comprised of minorities and 
immigrants, were now employed by public authorities and represented by 
unions.343 In 1999, amendments to the enabling state legislation mandated 
that each California County establish a public authority as an employer of 
 335. See Delp & Quan, supra note 331, at 15 tbl. 2. 
 336. Id. at 4, 6. 
 337. Id. at 6-8; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, supra note 330, at 7. 
 338. Delp & Quan, supra note 331, at 9; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12301.6, 12302, 
12302.25 (West 2008). 
 339. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12301.6(e). 
 340. Id at § 12301.6(c)(2)(B). 
 341. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.5. 
 342. Delp & Quan, supra note 330, at 11, 14 (providing a detailed recounting of the history of this 
effort). 
 343. Id. at 3, 15. 
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rder in Illinois 348and by legislative enactment in Massachusetts 
(200
s and delivery of services in a contemporary high velocity 
labor market. 
D. Constructing New Non-Exploitive Labor Market Intermediaries:: 
 
record for HCAs by 2003 and that the authority have a majority of 
consumer/recipients of in-house care on its governing board.344 Similar 
public authorities have been established for HCAs and/or home-based 
childcare workers by ballot initiative in Oregon (2000)345 and Washington 
(2002),346 by a state regulatory authority in Michigan (2004),347 by 
executive o
6).349 
The enabling legislation for these public authorities expressly 
recognizes that the employment relationship of HCAs is a triangular one, 
involving workers, employers who benefit directly from the work of the 
health care aides, and an LMI, the public authority.350 Recently enacted 
public authority statutes and gubernatorial orders preserve the health care 
recipient/employer’s right to hire, fire, and supervise while authorizing the 
public authority to bargain collectively with the union as representative of 
the HCAs.351 The public authority functions on the union-organized hiring 
hall model, serving the dual role of LMI and employer of record. The union 
negotiates the terms of deployment of HCAs with the public authority 
which, in turn, acts as representative of the thousands of individual 
employers whom the HCAs actually do work for. The unionized public 
authority model provides an example of how state intervention can create 
and effectively regulate a labor market intermediary to improve both the 
work condition
 344. Id. at 14-16. 
 345. See OR. REV. STAT. § 410.612 (2008) (establishing that “[f]or purposes of collective 
bargaining  . . . the Home Care Commission is the employer of record for home care workers”). 
 346. See WASH. REV. CODE § 74.39A.220-.903 (2008) (codifying Initiative Measure No. 775 and 
establishing a public home care quality authority to collectively bargain with a representative union of 
PCAs). 
 347. See Michigan Department of Community Health, Beneficiary Eligibility Bulletin (Nov. 23, 
2004), available at <http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HCEP_04-07_110034_7.pdf> (regarding the 
establishment of the Michigan Quality Community Care Council as an independent government agency 
to provide the right to collectively bargain for home care attendants); see also Michigan Quality 
Community Care Council, <http://www.mqccc.org/ portal> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2009). 
 348. Ill. Exec. Order 2005-1 (2005), available at <www.illinois.gov/gov/pdfdocs/exe corder2005-
1.pdf> (governing day care workers). 
 349. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, §§ 28-33 (2008) (home healthcare attendants). 
 350. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.118G, § 28 (expressly identifying the consumer or consumer 
surrogate, the workforce council, a statutorily limited employer of record, and the personal care 
attendant as parties in the employment relationship). 
 351. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 118G, § 31 (giving the consumer employer status stating that 
consumers or consumer surrogates “retain the right to select, hire, schedule, train, direct, supervise and 
terminate” PCAs provided to them by the workforce council). 
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Immigrant day laborers and their advoc
high
esponse to the growth of the informal contingent labor market, the 
orga
 
Immigrant Organizing in the Informal Economy 
ates are devising responses to 
-velocity contingent labor markets that have important implications for 
regulating profit-driven LMIs. Historically, the employer-sanctioned shape-
up was the classic market response to the running of contingent labor 
markets in the absence of some type of LMI. Workers would gather, or 
“shape-up,” daily on the docks or in front of packing houses vying with 
each other for short-term, low-wage jobs.352 The shape-up, a crude and 
exploitive means of hiring temporary labor associated with an earlier 
industrial era, is again a common fixture of the urban landscape as 
immigrant day laborers gather each day on street corners and in home 
center parking lots to compete for construction jobs, landscaping, and 
domestic work353 as did poor and immigrant workers one hundred years 
ago. The shape-up, albeit located at the temp agency office, is also the 
common hiring method at low-end temporary agencies that have 
proliferated in urban immigrant communities, providing labor for 
manufacturing, construction, food processing, and other manual jobs.354 
The revival of the shape-up is emblematic of the rise of the so-called 
“informal economy” where millions of undocumented immigrant workers 
are employed “off the books” or illegally classified as independent 
contractors in construction, landscaping, restaurant, and domestic jobs.355 
The core structure of this labor market recapitulates a central feature of 
American capitalism’s bygone industrial era – the marginal employment 
and super-exploitation of a vulnerable, largely immigrant, low-wage labor 
pool.356 
In r
nization of immigrant laborers has mushroomed. Backed by organized 
labor, the recently-formed National Day Laborers Organizing Network 
(NDLON) has undertaken a nationwide effort to defend the rights of 
workers who seek employment on street corners across America, at temp 
 352. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941: TURBULENT 
YEARS 254-56 (1970). 
 353. See ABEL VALENZUELA ET AL., ON THE CORNER: DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (UCLA 
Center for the Study of Urban Poverty Working Paper, 2006), available at <http:// 
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner1.pdf> (last visited Aug. 
9, 2009). 
 354. See BARLEY & KUNDA, supra note 39; Kerr & Dole, supra note 39, at 91-92; Jamie Peck & 
Nik Theodore, Contingent Chicago, Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary Labor, 25 INT’L J. URBAN 
& REG. RES. 471 (2001). 
 355. See, e.g., BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 10-25 (reporting on the geographic landscape 
of unregulated work in New York City). 
 356. See id.; see also PECK, supra note 100, at 8-11. 
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 primarily rooted in immigrant 
com
 
agencies, and through informal chains of labor agents operating across 
America.357 At the local level, workers centers are partnering with unions 
and central labor councils to develop mutually advantageous joint strategies 
and affiliations.358 For instance, an on-the-ground campaign is underway, 
jointly planned by NDLON and the Laborers International Union, to 
improve the conditions of thousands of undocumented immigrants working 
in major urban housing construction markets in California.359 Organized 
efforts addressing the problems of day labor are routinely leading to the 
establishment of worker centers, i.e. multi-faceted grass-roots institutions, 
which provide immigrant day laborers and others working in the informal 
economy with job-referral services and legal representation on matters such 
as wage and hour violations, immigrant rights, and a collective means of 
addressing common-workplace ills.360 In addition, in some areas, 
municipally sanctioned hiring locations allow day laborers to gain some 
measure of control over hiring and the terms of employment in order to 
rationalize job placement and allow for the enforcement of decent wages 
and working conditions for day laborers.361 
NDLON and most worker centers are
munities and focus on representing the interests of the growing 
transnational workforce, now estimated to include ten million 
undocumented workers.362 NDLON’s strategy of street-corner organizing 
targets the humiliating competition for work that inheres to unregulated 
 357. NDLON signed a formal partnership agreement with the AFL-CIO in August, 2006 to address 
the abysmal conditions confronting day laborers. AFL-CIO Press Release, AFL-CIO and NDLON, 
Largest Organization of Workers Centers, Enter Watershed Agreement to Improve Conditions of 
Working Families (Aug. 9, 2006), available at <http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr 
08092006.cfm> (last visited Aug. 9, 2009). NDLON made a similar arrangement with Change to Win, 
the loose federation of unions which left the AFL-CIO. See National Day Laborer Organizing Network, 
History of NDLON, <http://www.ndlon.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45& 
Itemid=73> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2008) (providing history of NDLON and its affiliation with the 
AFL-CIO and Change to Win.) 
 358. Of noted significance, a workers’center in Springfield, Massachusetts, Casa Obrera, has 
become formally affiliated with the Pioneer Valley Central Labor Council (AFL-CIO),  the 
coordinating body for the city’s AFL-CIO affiliated unions. <http:www.a-dp.org/documents/media 
coverage/june11republican.pdf> (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). 
 359. UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education, Organizing in the Building Trades, LAB. 
EDUC. NEWS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 6, available at <http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publications/news 
letters/pdfs/07sumfall.pdf> (last visited on Aug. 9, 2008). 
 360. See FINE, supra note 21. 
 361. Id. at 113. 
 362. The most comprehensive study of worker centers indicates the following nationality 
breakdown for the workers organized by centers: 45 percent Central and South American, 12 percent 
East Asian, another 12 percent Caribbean, 6 percent African, and 22 percent native-born with the 
remainder coming from Europe and other Asian countries. See FINE supra note 20, at 20-21. In his 
study of street-corner day laborers in Los Angeles, sociologist Abel Valenzuela et al. estimate that the 
vast majority of the 20,000 day laborers on street corners in that city are Hispanic. Valenzuela et al., 
supra note 355, at iii. 
FREEMAN AND GONOS  11/20/2009  11:11:02 AM 
2009] TAMING THE EMPLOYMENT SHARKS 165 
lar importance to our discussion, some worker centers and 
NDL
 363. See Common Ground: A Study Conducted by the National Day Laborers’ Organizing 
ra note 21, at xii n.2. 
 note 21, at 113. 
e in Day Labor Fight Runs Right Outside Home Depot, N.Y. 
I
 Laborer Rule Okd: L.A. Adopts Day Laborer Rules for Home 
labor markets and informal hiring sites where it is routine for employers to 
violate wage and hour law by hiring at sub-minimum wages and breaking 
commitments to pay workers the full wage promised for their labor.363 
Moral suasion aimed at voluntary employer compliance with the demands 
of day laborers, public protest exposing anti-worker practices, and legal 
action to enforce wage and hour laws are all part of the worker center 
model. The rising consciousness of day laborers combined with the social 
weight of the sponsors of the worker centers – often religious 
organizations, unions and legal service organizations – provide a variety of 
means of enforcing better wages and working conditions for those who use 
the centers.364 
Of particu
ON affiliates have taken on the role of LMIs. Janice Fine, a leading 
chronicler of the worker center movement, defines worker centers as 
“community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low-wage 
workers.”365 The market mediating functions assumed by centers include 
policing shape-up sites, leading campaigns to strike down ordinances 
banning public solicitation by workers for jobs, and in some municipalities, 
forming nascent hiring halls.366 NDLON and worker centers have also 
defended the right of day laborers to solicit work in public venues without 
interference, crackdowns, or raids by local and federal authorities.367 A 
coordinated push to enact local laws that create safe space for day laborers 
has taken two approaches. The first is to require home centers like Home 
Depot and Lowe’s to designate areas in their parking lots where day 
laborers can gather to bring a modicum of concerted pressure on employers 
and have access to sanitary facilities.368 Most notably, in August, 2008, an 
NDLON-led effort resulted in the Los Angeles City Council unanimously 
enacting an ordinance requiring certain “big-box” home improvement 
stores to construct day labor centers with shelter, drinking water, 
bathrooms, and trash cans on their properties.369 Alternatively, some 
 
Network, Written in Conjunction with Sue McCarty and George Faraday, University of Maryland 
School of Law Labor Law Clinic. <http://www.ndlon.org/resources/CommonGroundReport-Eng.pdf> 
(visited Sept. 21, 2009).  
 364. See id.  
 365. FINE, sup
 366. Id. at 113-15. 
 367. See FINE, supra
 368. See Steve Greenhouse, Front Lin
T MES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A16. 
 369. Anna Gorman, Day
Improvement Stores, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at 3; see Los Angeles Ordinance 180,174 (2008) 
(codified at L.A. MUN. CODE art. I, ch. 12.24(U)(14)), available at <http://clkrep.lacity.org/ 
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representation of its members was not systematic enough to establish it as a 
municipalities are designating First Amendment protected public sites, 
where day laborers can organize free of harassment. Facing ruthless 
employers and aggressive enforcement of immigration law by the 
Department of Homeland Security, worker centers continue to evolve new 
strategic means of protecting the rights of immigrant day laborers in order 
to “remov[e] some perversity from the status quo, in which the benefits of 
illegal immigration largely flow to unscrupulous employers.”370 
Accordingly, worker centers may evolve into widely utilized new forms of 
worker-sponsored LMIs that attempt to put in place institutional solutions 
for contingent labor that offer an alternative to market-driven temp 
agencies that deploy workers to construction, manufacturing, landscaping, 
and other unskilled jobs. 
Unfortunately, the structure and trajectory of the worker center 
phenomena create the possibility that the centers will fall squarely within 
the regime of regulation which already cabins the effectiveness and reach 
of the worker centers’ more mature institutional cousin, the union hiring 
hall. As labor attorney David Rosenfeld has noted, the extreme sweep of 
the NLRA’s definition of labor organization371 arguably subjects most 
worker centers to the NLRA’s prohibitions on certain kinds of strikes, 
pickets, boycotts, and the ability to negotiate pre-hire agreements with 
employers outside of the construction industry.372 Indeed, New York City 
restaurant employers responded to a campaign by a worker center, The 
Restaurant Opportunity Center (ROC-NY) by filing complaints with the 
NLRB.373 The employers charged that ROC-NY was a labor organization 
and committed a series of unfair labor practices.374 Fortunately, the NLRB 
General Counsel issued an Advisory Memo concluding that ROC-NY’s 
 
onlinedocs/2008/08-1657_ord_180174.pdf> (last viewed Aug. 9, 2009). 
 370. Street Corner Solidarity, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A22. 
 371. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006) defines a labor organization as “any organization of any kind, or 
any agency . . . which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.” 
 372. David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations – Until They Confront the 
National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 469, 471-82 (2006). 
 373. Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Redeye Grill) Cases 2-CP-1067, 2-CB-20643 
548-0100; Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Fireman Hospitality Group Café Concepts, 
Inc.), Cases 2-CP-1071, 2-CB-20705; Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (65th Street 
Restaurant LLC d/b/a Restaurant Daniel) Cases 2-CP-1073; 2-CB-20787, NLRB Gen. Couns. Adv. 
Mem. (Nov. 30, 2006), available at <http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_ files/Advice%20Memos/2006/2-CP-
1067.pdf> (last viewed Aug. 9, 2009). 
 374. The employers charged ROC-NY with “recognitional picketing in violation of Section 
8(b)(7)(C); . . . attempts to force representation on employees absent majority support in violation of 
Section 8(b)(1)(A); and [forcing] employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of ROCNY 
membership in violation of Section 8(b)(2).” Id. at 1. 
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ker center advocates are the first to admit that their capacity 
and 
VII. CONCLUSION: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE LEGAL STATUS OF FOR-
Our conclusion offers a set of proposals to redress the grievances of 
the g
A. Advances in Regulating For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries: the 
At least eight states now  regulating some 
 
labor organization.375 However, the General Counsel’s memo did not 
preclude such a finding in the future should a worker center’s conduct be 
“shown to constitute a pattern or practice of dealing over time.”376 In sum, 
the current legal regime has the capacity to disadvantage and confine even 
nascent worker-initiated, labor-based organizations that are interceding in 
contingent labor markets as institutional alternatives to the commercial 
temp agency. 
Still, wor
organizing efforts are dwarfed by the immense size of the informal 
economy.377 Campaigns aimed at persuading day laborers to abandon the 
street to “join” or make use of worker centers and hiring sites bumps up 
against the large numbers of undocumented day laborers and the growing 
market demand for their labor, compounded by anti-immigrant politics and 
legislation. Nevertheless, the organizing of day laborers has focused 
national attention on the routine abuses faced by the day labor workforce in 
the informal economy and provides an ongoing moral, legal, and political 
compass for those defending the rights of day laborers.378 
PROFIT LABOR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES 
rowing workforce deployed by the for-profit temp agency industry and 
to create a level legal playing field so that more nonstandard workers can 
choose to find work through union hiring halls and other not-for-profit 
LMIs that are developing as alternatives. We start with an assessment of 
the strengths and shortcomings of recent legislative initiatives designed to 
regulate abusive temp agency practices and end with a set of legal reforms 
that reconceptualize the legal status of commercial temp agencies to bring 
transparency to their mediating functions and to regulate the hidden fees 
they charge.  
Day Labor Statutes 
have statutes specifically
 375. Id. at 3. 
 376. Id. 
 377. See FINE, supra note 21, at 102. 
 378. Rosenfeld, supra note 374, at 477. 
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aspect of the temp agency industry.379 Most aim to curtail the abusive 
treatment of low-wage day laborers in specific by remedying violations of 
minimum wage standards, protecting health and safety, and preventing 
agencies from monopolizing access to employment. A key provision in 
most temp agency/day labor statutes outlaws mandatory deductions that 
cause wages to fall below minimum wage. This includes required 
transportation costs to or from the actual worksite380 and charges for 
required safety equipment381 or mandatory check cashing privileges.382 
Temp agency statutes use different means to address the fact that temp 
workers are often hired to perform the most dangerous work at a job site. 
Illinois requires at the time of dispatch that a day labor agency provide a 
written statement to the worker indicating the nature of the work to be 
performed and whether equipment is provided.383 Georgia mandates both 
that the temp agency (termed a “labor pool”) and the work site employer 
inform the worker if the job involves exposure to hazardous chemicals and 
that they obtain written consent from the worker before the job 
commences.384 Four states prevent temp agencies from using restrictive 
covenants or other contractual arrangements to prevent or constrain 
workers from moving to “permanent” employment with the client firm. 
These statutes prohibit a temp agency from restricting the right of a day 
laborer to accept a full-time job from a client-employer or from prohibiting 
the client-employer from offering a temp worker deployed to its workplace 
a full-time job.385 
Enforcement provisions vary. Some states promote enforcement with 
 379. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-551 to 553 (2008); FLA. STAT. §§ 448.20 to 448.26 (2008); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-2 (2008), 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/1-99 (2008); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS. ch. 149, § 159C (2008); N.M. STAT. §§ 50-15-1 to 15-7 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-
6.10-1 to 6.10-5 (2008);TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001 to 92.031 (Vernon 2007); see also National 
Employment Law Project, supra note 303. 
 380. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 149 § 159C (prohibiting charging transportation fees from 
the agency or labor pool site to the work location) 
 381. Charging fees for safety equipment is banned in three states: Texas (TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 
92.025), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-10-2), and Florida (FLA. STAT. § 448.24). 
 382. ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 44-1362; FLA. STAT. § 448.25; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/30(d); N.M. 
STAT. §50-15-5; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.023. 
 383. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/25. 
 384. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-10-3. 
 385. Notably, the American Staffing Association stresses the temp industy’s right to impose such 
restrictions on its employees’ freedom of movement based on the claim that the agencies have the “right 
to be free from unlawful interference with their employee relationships.” American Staffing 
Association, <http://www.staffingtoday.net/legaland government/issue_papers.cfm> (last visited May 
25, 2009). But Arizona (ARIZ. REV. ST. ANN. § 25-553), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 448.24), Illinois (820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40), and New Mexico (N.M. STAT. §50-15-4(D)) expressly prohibit such 
restrictions, long common in the temp industry. Florida, Illinois and New Mexico do, however, permit a 
temp agency to collect a placement fee when a worker takes a direct-hire job with a user firm. FLA. 
STAT. § 448.24; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/40; N.M. STAT. §50-15-4(D). 
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recordkeeping requirements and an obligation to provide detailed pay 
statements to temp workers.386 But only three states have statutory 
provisions that create a private right of action for temp workers to enforce 
the law;387 the other states all require that state agencies initiate 
enforcement action. Texas and New Mexico make enforcement especially 
challenging by making a violation of its temp agency statutes a criminal 
misdemeanor, thus requiring the state to prove a knowing or intentional 
violation to enforce the statute.388 
On the federal level, U.S. Congressman Luis Guttierrez (D-IL) 
introduced the Day Laborer Fairness and Protection Act (DLFPA) in 
2003,389 reviving Congressional attempts to regulate the use of day laborers 
and other contingent workers who “provide employers with a flexible 
workforce and contribute significantly to interstate commerce.”390 
Although DLFPA, like the state laws discussed above, limits its reach to 
manual day labor, it is more comprehensive than any of the state bills and 
contains more stringent regulatory language to govern temp agency 
employment and street-corner hiring. DFLPA defends the First 
Amendment rights of day laborers to solicit work on corners, prohibits 
temp agencies from charging a fee to workers who accept permanent 
employment, and bans charging day laborers fees for transportation from 
the point of hire to the workplace. In addition, the bill contains an anti-
retaliation provision to prevent employers from calling immigration agents 
when day laborers assert their rights under the act. The bill also provides a 
private right of action and a ban on deploying day laborers as 
strikebreakers.391 
Importantly, recent laws regulating the temp agency industry identify 
the distinct role of staffing agencies in the triangular employment 
relationship392 and the particular vulnerability of day laborers393 as the 
basis for regulating the industry. Notably, these statutes subject the profit-
driven temporary help agency to some level of regulation while expressly 
 386. FLA. STAT. § 448.24(e); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-10-2(4); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/12; N.M. 
STAT. §50-15-6(B). 
 387. FLA. STAT. § 448.25; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-10-3(c), 32-10-4; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
175/95. 
 388. N.M. STAT. § 50-15-7; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.031. 
 389. H.R. 2870, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 390. Id. at § 2(7). 
 391. Id. at §§ 16, 18. 
 392. E.g. Illinois’ Day and Temporary Labor Services Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5 defines a 
day and temporary labor service agency as “any person or entity engaged in the business of employing 
day or temporary laborers to provide services, for a fee, to or for any third party client pursuant to a 
contract with the day and temporary labor service and the third party client.” 
 393. See, e.g., id. 175/2. 
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excluding from their coverage union hiring halls and not-for-profit worker 
centers. However, with one exception, all statutes regulating temp agencies 
protect only unskilled manual laborers. Temp agencies that employ clerical 
workers, semi-skilled workers, professionals, and agricultural workers are 
beyond the reach of these laws,394 which thus protect only about 35 percent 
of the workforce deployed by the commercial temp industry.395 
Consequently, even the minimal requirements in the Illinois and Texas 
statutes mandating that temp agencies register with a state agency396 only 
apply to temp agencies that deploy manual unskilled workers, excluding 
most temps who work outside the fields of construction and manufacturing. 
The state laws and proposed federal legislation summarized above are 
aimed primarily at preventing temp agencies from violating work laws 
already on the books that have been difficult to enforce in the non-standard 
temporary employment agency setting, e.g. compliance with minimum 
wage requirements and health and safety rules. As such, they offer a 
critically needed, if extremely patchy, floor to protect highly vulnerable 
low-wage day laborers from the inscrutable practices of LMIs in a largely 
unregulated labor market. Still, they fall far short of covering the range of 
needed protections that were contained in state employment laws early in 
the twentieth century397 or those protections that community temp worker 
organizing efforts have called for in their proposed “codes of conduct” for 
the temp industry.398 Even the more comprehensive provisions in the 
proposed DLFPA – which states that its purpose is to ensure “workplace 
dignity” and to reduce the “unfair competitive advantage for firms that 
abuse day laborers”399 – severely underutilize the government’s regulatory 
power in this area. 
Most notably, neither state laws currently on the books nor the 
proposed federal bill squarely address the most exploitive feature of temp 
 394. This shortcoming, i.e. the narrow focus of the low-wage manual labor sector, has been a 
feature of proposed regulation for the industry since the early 1970s. See Befort, supra note 13, at 154-
58; National Employment Law Project, supra note 303. No doubt this narrow focus reflects practical 
political considerations concerning the prospects for passage, yet it is also based on the assumption that 
“high-end” temp workers are not exploited, a premise the authors of this article reject as factually 
inaccurate and misguided at a policy level. 
 395. The American Staffing Association reports that the percentages of temp workers by industry 
are 35.1 percent industrial, 7.8 percent health care, 21 percent managerial, 20.4 percent office-clerical, 
and 15.7 percent technical-IT. AmericanStaffing.net, Staffing Statistics, <www.americanstaffing.net/ 
statistics/images/downloads/SES/StaffingSurveyfigure1_2006.jpg> (last visited on May 30, 2009). 
 396. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/45; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.011. 
 397. See supra Part III B. 
 398. For example, New York greengrocers agreed to create a voluntary code of conduct which 
included guidelines for treatment of day laborers in the grocery industry. See Local237.com, 
<http://www.local237.com/newsline/2006/0906_2.html> (last visited May 30, 2009). 
 399. H.R. 2870, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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industry employment, the hidden fee or mark-up which flows to the temp 
agency as a result of the difference between the wage rate of the temp 
worker and the contract price paid by the user firm for the “service” 
provided by the temp agency. No matter how this difference is 
characterized, i.e. as a hidden fee charged to the temp worker or as the 
mark-up or fee charged to the client firm, this differential accounts for the 
patent disparity between the wages and benefits of temp workers and those 
of “regular” employees who perform equivalent or comparable work. 
B. Legal Recognition of the Temp Agency’s Dual Status: Creating 
Transparency and Regulating Fee-Charging 
The fact that regulation of fee-charging is not part of the ongoing 
policy debate on temp agency labor speaks to the failure of current efforts 
to address the underlying economics of the for-profit staffing industry and 
the flexible economy. Beyond the augmented profits immediately accrued 
from the use of temp labor, the dynamics of the two-tiered internal labor 
markets created by the temp industry and its clients over time weakens the 
bargaining position and diminishes the wage gains of all workers, both 
temp and standard. The impoverished dialogue regarding the social ills that 
result from the unregulated use of LMIs is best appreciated by considering 
that it was a century ago when the IWW first popularized the slogan, 
“Don’t Buy Jobs!”400 in order to highlight fee-charging as the core social ill 
associated with for-profit LMIs. This was not merely anarchist 
sloganeering. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis forcefully argued in 
his dissent in Adams v. Tanner that allowing workers to pay a fee to an 
employment agency for access to the job market was antithetical to 
fundamental American values.401 As late as 1971, in the course of hearings 
on the proposed Day Labor Protection Act,402 the issue of the fee was still 
being publicly debated. Senator Walter Mondale spoke forcefully about the 
“unconscionable fees” which the young temp agency industry extracted 
from agency temp workers, condemning the fact that “there are no controls 
or limits on what private temporary help supply firms may . . . charge for 
what are in substance placement fees.”403 
Senator Mondale’s concerns were not heeded. By that time, the 
 400. See FELLOW WORKERS AND FRIENDS, supra note 119, at 30. 
 401. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 597-614 (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see also supra note 133 
and accompanying text. 
 402. H.R. 10349, 92d Cong. (1971) was never enacted. Similar bills failed in the face of stiff 
opposition from the temp industry in 1975 and 1987. 
 403. 117 Cong. Rec. 28, S36653 (1971). 
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largely-ignored lobbying efforts of the newly formed industry trade group 
had created the legal groundwork for the rise of the modern temp agency, 
altering the states’ employment agency laws to avoid any controls or limits 
on the temporary agencies’ hidden fee- charging structure, setting the legal 
framework for the industry’s rapid growth in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. This change in the legal environment, amounting to 
industry deregulation, occurred without real public debate.404 
Consequently, the crude amendments to state employment agency law 
effectively eliminated the agency markup from the definition of fee, not 
only in the statute books, but more importantly in the public mind. By 
inscribing in the law the notion that the temp industry was simply another 
employer in the job market and charged no fees to workers, the temp 
industry was able to reframe the public presentation of the temporary 
staffing industry as a free “service.” The far-reaching consequences of 
merely altering the legal definition of what constituted an employment 
agency by creating a separate legal category for “temporary help service 
firm” powerfully illustrates William Forbath’s argument that the language 
of law can have a powerful and formative effect on consciousness and on 
the working class’s ability to imagine and create alternative structures of 
workplace governance.405 
Eliminating the legal discourse of fee charging, of course, does not 
change the economic realities of temp agency work. Profits are still derived 
from the difference between the hourly rate a client firm pays the temp 
agency for “using” a worker and the wage paid.406 The temp industry, of 
course, can legally proclaim to workers it recruits that it never charges any 
temp worker a fee, claiming that all fees are paid by the client firms.407 But, 
as we demonstrated above, the formalistic logic of this position is belied by 
the actual dynamics of “cost-saving” and wage setting in the industry.408 
Moreover, the high turnover rate and extreme degree of job mobility 
in the temp industry labor market work to undermine the development of a 
collective workplace identity and make it difficult for temps to act in a 
concerted fashion to address workplace ills.409 In short, there are only 
nominal market forces to counter the inexorable drive to lower wages and 
reduce benefits for workers employed by the for-profit temp agency 
 404. Supra Part V. 
 405. See generally WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 167-73 (1993). 
 406. Fernandez-Mateo, supra note 71, at 293. 
 407. See Gonos, supra note 48, at 589-91. 
 408. See supra Part II.C. 
 409. See ROGERS, supra note 29, at 126. 
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industry. Absent government regulation of the temp industry’s hidden fee 
or markup and legal reforms that encourage organization and a stronger 
collective voice for temps, there is little that can be done to reverse second-
class status of workers employed in this part of the contingent workforce. 
The widespread institutionalization of contingent work arrangements 
and the growing reliance on profit-driven LMIs offer sound reasons to 
revive a discussion on how to regulate the operations of temp agencies, 
and, in specific, the fees charged by them and other profit-driven LMIs. To 
respond to this economic reality, we propose a regulatory system guided by 
two underlying principles. First, legislation should establish a “bottom line” 
of fair and transparent functioning of the commercial temp agency and 
other similarly situated LMIs. Second, reforms of labor law should allow 
for the unionization of temp workers deployed by for-profit LMIs, thus 
leveling the playing field so that union sponsored LMIs can operate under a 
set of market place rules comparable to those governing profit-driven 
LMIs. Both sets of reform are predicated on crafting a legal definition of 
the commercial LMI that captures its dual status as an employer of record 
and, more importantly, as an employment agent or market intermediary. 
Assigning the commercial LMI a dual legal status recognizes the economic 
reality of the commercial LMI’s functions as being analogous to that of the 
union hiring hall which the federal courts have defined as being both an 
employment agent and an employer.410 These two related reform proposals 
eliminate the double standard that legally bifurcates the regulation of LMIs 
– extensive federal oversight and regulation of union-run hiring halls on the 
one hand, and a laissez-faire system for the profit-driven temp industry, on 
the other. Moreover, these reforms complement and strengthen the 
provisions of recently enacted and proposed temp agency laws by adding 
an overarching and well-established legal principle that has long governed 
the conduct of employment agents – a legislatively derived duty or 
fiduciary-like obligation to disclose to workers the terms and conditions of 
their deployment. 
The first set of reforms can be easily accomplished by reviving the 
once-expansive reach of state employment agency statutes. By again 
including commercial LMIs in the definition of employment agencies, 
these statutes would provide a framework to mandate disclosure of fee 
schedules, i.e. the contractual terms temp agencies negotiate with client 
firms that would allow temp workers to identify the markup or fee being 
made by the temp agency. A second and related requirement is the 
institution of fee ceilings to regulate the rate of exploitation in the labor-
 410. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. 
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only employment contract by limiting the mark up to a certain percentage 
of the hourly wage paid. Fulfilling this obligation might require temp 
agencies to, for example, provide workers with written receipts specifying 
not just pay rates and other terms of employment, but also the difference 
between the wages paid a temp worker and the amount the agency is 
receiving from the user firm. Regulation could require the use of objective 
standards to determine which workers are referred to preferred jobs and in 
what order they are deployed. Such standards are common in the contracts 
governing the deployment of workers through union hiring halls. In sum, 
crafting a statutory provision defining for-profit LMIs as employment 
agents and establishing a concomitant set of legal obligations owed to temp 
workers would impose an enforceable level of transparency on temp 
agencies comparable to that which is required of private sector union hiring 
halls under federal law and of the public authorities deploying HCAs under 
state laws and union-sponsored collective bargaining agreements.  
A second set of reforms is needed so that federal labor law can 
effectively protect the rights of non-standard workers employed through 
temp agencies in high velocity labor markets. The use of union-sponsored 
LMIs is thwarted by the NLRB’s crabbed interpretation of the joint 
employer doctrine.411 Collective bargaining rights for temps requires that 
the NLRB revive and expand the rule applied in M.B. Sturgis.412 As it now 
stands, accreting temp workers into established bargaining units or 
organizing temp workers alongside standard workers requires the assent of 
the temp agency and the user employer.413 This rule rests on the presumed 
legal status of the temp agency as an independent employer rather than an 
LMI. Crediting the temp agency as the prime employer of temp workers 
creates an illogical obstacle to recognizing the community of interest 
shared by temp and permanent workers at their common locus of 
production or service work. 
Statutory reform of labor law is also needed to broaden the reach of 
section 8(f) of the NLRA414 to permit unions to negotiate pre-hire 
agreements in high velocity and seasonal labor markets outside the 
construction industry.415 Flexible labor markets throughout the economy 
now mirror the seasonal or intermittent employment that characterizes the 
construction industry, justifying the expansion of the pre-hire agreement 
 411. See supra Part V.A, B. 
 412. See supra Part VI. 
 413. Id. 
 414. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f). 
 415. See STONE, supra note 1, at 238; Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival 
Strategies for the Twenty-First Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 172-73 (1996). 
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wherever temporary labor is used. The logic of this proposal rests on the 
policy that underlies Congress’ decision to exempt the construction 
industry from the NLRA’s prohibition against pre-hire agreements: 
recognition that short-term and transient employment patterns make 
ordinary patterns of union organizing practically impossible.416 
Currently, commercial staffing agencies regularly enter into contracts 
with user firms that function exactly like union negotiated pre-hire 
agreements. Moreover, commercial LMIs can negotiate and enforce what 
are in effect exclusive “closed shop” hiring arrangements that allow temp 
agencies to serve as exclusive gatekeepers to certain job markets.417 The 
statutory text of the NLRA – concerned only with the contractual 
agreements between labor organizations and employers – turns a blind eye 
to staffing industry practices which are outside the purview of labor. As a 
result, the statutory framework of federal labor law handicaps the labor 
movement’s ability to use pre-hire agreements to mount organizing 
campaigns among temporary and transient workforces outside the 
construction industry. And, of course, unions are prohibited in all cases 
from instituting a closed shop. Reforming section 8(f) of the NLRA to 
permit unions to negotiate pre-hire agreements in any labor market where 
temp workers make up a significant portion of the labor force would bring 
occupational unionism and hiring hall structures to a host of industries that 
routinely use temp agency workers to meet rapidly shifting schedules or 
staffing requirements. This would be a significant step to level the playing 
field so that union-sponsored LMIs could effectively compete in the 
private-sector’s ever-expanding, non-standard labor markets monopolized 
by for-profit staffing agencies. 
Finally, using the state’s regulatory power to challenge the dominance 
of the for-profit temp agency requires reconsideration of the Progressive 
reformers’ call for public labor exchanges to challenge commercial LMIs. 
In this regard, expanding the home care workforce model now in use in 
California, Michigan, and other states provides a model for other high 
mobility labor markets. The home health care LMI provides a proven 
institutional structure that operates in high mobility labor markets but 
alleviates the exploitive hidden fee that burdens workers deployed through 
commercial LMIs. 
Reform of workplace law to improve the conditions of contingent and 
 416. See van Jaarsveld, supra note 10, at 357-63. 
 417. Indeed, provisions of the temp agency statutes enacted by some states address an aspect of this 
problem by banning any contractual provisions that prevent a temp worker from accepting a permanent 
position with the client firm where he performs work. See supra note 387. 
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low-wage workers may seem far off. Indeed, courts have eschewed a 
rights-expanding interpretation of federal workplace law, and legislative 
initiatives to revise workplace law have fared no better.418 American 
workplace law has been seen as being relatively impermeable to 
substantive revision.419 But the force of social movements can quickly 
change the mood and views of legislators and judges, as demonstrated by 
the rapid adoption of legal reforms following the labor movement’s popular 
upsurge in the early 1930s. It is of course difficult to predict when a major 
upsurge will occur. Consider that virtually no labor activists or academics 
predicted the gigantic 2006 May Day demonstrations and general strike for 
immigrant rights which was led, in part, by activists affiliated with worker 
centers and day labor organizations like NDLON.420 Organized labor and 
its allies are involved in ongoing discussions on how to organize for and 
anticipate the next working class upsurge or social movement that has the 
potential to shift the balance of class forces in the U.S.421 It is during these 
upsurges that fundamental legal reform becomes possible.422 Our hope is 
that this essay provides some tools that will be useful when the next 
upsurge makes possible a new legal paradigm to challenge the exploitation 
of temp workers by commercial staffing agencies and allow for the 
expansion of non-exploitive, alternative intermediaries for the nonstandard 
labor force. 
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